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I. INTRODUCTION
On the July day in 2010 that President Barack Obama signed into
law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank Act” or “Act”), 1 he paused to recognize the challenges that
had been overcome to pass the new law in the wake of the greatest
financial crisis since the Great Depression. 2 In his remarks, he stated that
“[p]assing this bill was no easy task. To get there, we had to overcome
the furious lobbying of an array of powerful interest groups and a partisan
minority determined to block change.” 3 The final act of signing the
legislation into law was the result of over a year of activity to enact “a
sweeping overhaul of the financial regulatory system, a transformation
on a scale not seen since the reforms that followed the Great
Depression.” 4
The new law was the product of a concerted effort to address the
many causes of the recent financial crisis and to put in place protections
against similar future crises. It also was the embodiment of the famous
admonition of Rahm Emanuel, then-White House Chief of Staff, that,
“[y]ou never want a serious crisis to go to waste.” 5 Yet even in that
moment of celebration there was clearly a recognition that while one
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
2. See Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by President at Signing of Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010) [hereinafter Obama,
Statement at Signing of Dodd-Frank], https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protectionact [https://perma.cc/295C-RVSD].
3. Id.
4. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial
Reform (June 17, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-regulatory-reform/ [https://perma.cc/9X66-33WN].
5. Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 21, 2008, 12:01
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122721278056345271 [https://perma.cc/YXW9VWGX] (quoting Rahm Emanuel). Although this quote has over time has come to be used
as an example of gross political expediency, the full discussion in context was more
bipartisan. Emanuel went on to say:

And what I mean by that is an opportunity to do things that you think you
could not do before. . . . This crisis provides the opportunity, for us, as I
would say, the opportunity to do things that you could not do before. The
good news, I suppose, if you want to see a silver lining, is the problems
are big enough that they lend themselves to ideas from both parties for
the solution.
Id.
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phase of financial reform was over, another was just beginning. President
Obama said: “Now, it doesn’t mean our work is over. For these new rules
to be effective, regulators will have to be vigilant.” 6
The President’s comments were prescient, as even then,
opponents of the new law were organizing and strategizing their next
steps. As one prominent Washington financial lobbyist said: “[T]he
signing of Dodd-Frank last July represented ‘halftime’ in the debate.
Now opponents must fight a two-front war that has them trying to
persuade elected officials to rethink decisions while influencing the
regulators whose job it is to implement Dodd-Frank.” 7 However, the
declaration of a two-front war did not begin to describe the scope of the
brewing opposition effort. The attacks against the Dodd-Frank Act
would not be limited to efforts to persuade Congress or to influence
regulators. As Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy F. Geithner, said after
eighteen months of implementing the Act:
The forces working against reform are trying a range of
different strategies, including blocking appointments of
new leadership to key oversight positions, cutting
funding, policy riders on appropriations bills, new
legislation to repeal the entire law or just critical pieces
of it, efforts to use cost-benefit analysis as roadblocks to
reform, and other efforts to slow the pace of
implementation of regulation in the hopes of watering it
down. 8
This Article documents and analyzes several ways in which the
Dodd-Frank Act has been challenged over the past decade. Part II briefly
discusses the ongoing lobbying efforts in both Congress and at the
regulatory agencies to affect the implementation of the Act. 9 Part III
analyzes some of the key litigation that shaped the rulemaking under the
6. Obama, Statement at Signing of Dodd-Frank, supra note 2.
7. Gary Rivlin, The Billion Dollar Bank Heist, NEWSWEEK (July 11, 2011, 1:00 AM),

https://www.newsweek.com/billion-dollar-bank-heist-68427 [https://perma.cc/7JQS-RKJK]
(referring to Scott Talbott, then-Head of Government Affairs at the Financial Services
Roundtable).
8. Timothy F. Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks at The
Macroprudential Toolkit: Measurement and Analysis Conference (Dec. 1, 2011),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1371.aspx
[https://perma.cc/7HGX-ZKDT].
9. See infra Part II.
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Act. 10 Part IV discusses the legislative actions undertaken to amend the
Act. 11 Part V concludes by identifying remaining challenges to
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act. 12
II. LOBBYING
Recognizing the broad impact that financial reform legislation
would have on the financial industry if it became law, large amounts of
money were spent by opponents of reform on lobbying to influence the
Dodd-Frank bill as it moved through Congress. At the height of the
debate on the bill during the summer of 2010, the banks spent $27.3
million over just three months to influence the outcome. 13 Yet, the bill’s
final outcome—with its many provisions placing restrictions on the
operations of large financial institutions, 14 such as the Volcker Rule 15—
begs the question of how much value that the industry received for its
money.
With the debate surrounding the Dodd-Frank Act’s passage
following so closely after the financial crisis and the passage of the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 16 which established the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), big banks were severely
hindered by a toxic public reputation in their efforts to lobby Congress.
As House Financial Services Chairman Barney Frank remarked:
“Beginning with TARP, they lost influence . . . . They substantially lost
influence over the legislative process when Lehman Brothers collapsed

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
Pat Garofalo, Wall Street Spending as Much to Undermine Dodd-Frank Regulations
as It Spent Trying to Block Dodd-Frank, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 22, 2011, 4:00 PM),
https://thinkprogress.org/wall-street-spending-as-much-to-undermine-dodd-frankregulations-as-it-spent-trying-to-block-dodd-284cda06d99/
[https://perma.cc/KR7KMULP].
14. Provisions in the bill opposed by large financial institutions included the Volker Rule,
living wills, enhanced capital requirements, the swaps pushout rule, and the creation of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).
15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2018). The Volcker Rule generally prohibits any banking entity from
engaging in proprietary trading or from retaining an ownership interest in, sponsoring, or
having certain relationships with a hedge fund or private equity fund. See id.
16. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
10.
11.
12.
13.
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and the crisis hit, and they never regained it.” 17 The damage to the
reputations of the largest financial institutions that began with the
financial crisis persists to this day. As one financial industry lobbyist
said: “Our reputation took quite a hit.” 18 He went on to contrast pre-crisis
lobbying with lobbying today stating that: “In those days, we’re taking
one or two office visits to convince a lawmaker. Now sometimes it runs
on three to four years. That may [still not] get done.” 19 A 2016 poll
found that 58% of those polled believed that Wall Street does more to
harm the lives of Americans than help. 20
At the same time, the influence of community banks—who
consistently pointed out to Capitol Hill and the media that they had not
been the cause of the financial crisis or received government bailouts—
increased markedly in Congress and among the public. 21 Given the
challenges to their ability to directly influence legislation because of their
political unpopularity, the large financial institutions adopted strategies
to project their influence in less direct and public ways. “Their influence
in Congress was greatest when they could make their case quietly, out of
public view.” 22 Instead of advocating directly, they started to use
community institutions “as the point of the spear on their lobbying efforts
. . . essentially using small-bank legislation as a vehicle for large-bank
provisions.” 23
The large banks, nevertheless, also continued to make campaign
contributions to try to ensure that their voices were heard. Over the last
four election cycles since passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate industries have contributed over $1.2
billion to the Republican Party and its candidates directly, and

17. Victoria Finkel, The Crisis isn’t Over, AM. BANKER (July 29, 2018),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/the-crisis-isnt-over
[https://perma.cc/Y7VTSAWT].
18. Sylvan Lane, Pushing for Change for Banks, HILL (July 12, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://thehill.com/policy/finance/454223-pushing-for-change-for-banks
[https://perma.cc/ZMW4-D28Q].
19. Id. (alteration in original).
20. Nancy Marshall-Genzer, Why Americans Feel the Economy is Rigged,
MARKETPLACE (June 29, 2016), https://www.marketplace.org/2016/06/29/why-americansfeel-economy-rigged/ [https://perma.cc/6BPD-DJZ2].
21. Finkel, supra note 17.
22. ROBERT G. KAISER, ACT OF CONGRESS: HOW AMERICA’S ESSENTIAL INSTITUTION
WORKS, AND HOW IT DOESN’T 83 (Vintage Books, 1st ed. 2014) (2013).
23. Finkel, supra note 17.
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approximately $853 million to Democrats. 24 The results of their postDodd-Frank Act legislative efforts are discussed in Part IV of this
Article. 25
While continuing to lobby Congress and contribute to campaigns
in the hope of influencing legislation, the large financial institutions also
shifted their efforts to the less public and more obscure battlefields of the
regulatory agencies and the courts. Although a huge piece of legislation
at 849 pages, the Dodd-Frank Act is far broader in its construction than it
is deep. Covering topics from systemic risk to large bank resolution to
derivatives to the regulation of credit rating agencies, the Act has sixteen
titles and numerous subtitles. However, in many areas, the Act provides
only broad authority or general direction, often relying on rulemaking by
the regulatory agencies to fill the legislative voids. According to one law
firm tracking the Dodd-Frank Act’s implementation, the agencies were
required to implement 390 rulemaking requirements. 26
The extensive rulemaking required to implement the Dodd-Frank
Act provided many opportunities for interested parties to influence the
rulemaking process, and the financial industry immediately directed its
best legal talent and substantial resources at this critical aspect of the
law’s implementation. Through the first five years of implementation of
the Dodd-Frank Act, the financial industry reported spending over $2.08
billion for lobbying expenses, much of it to influence federal agencies
rather than Congress. 27 The financial regulatory agencies foresaw the
coming onslaught and determined that public disclosure might provide
some degree of insulation from the industry’s aggressive lobbying. Very
early in the rulemaking process, the regulatory agencies announced that
they intended to go beyond the public notice requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) 28 by publishing logs of their
private meetings with interested parties on their websites to ensure public
24. Finance/Insurance/Real
Estate:
Long-Term
Contribution
Trends,
CTR.
FOR
RESPONSIVE
POLS.,
OPENSECRETS.ORG:
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?ind=F
[https://perma.cc/BZ5N-6VZA]
(last visited Jan. 31, 2020).
25. See infra Part IV (discussing legislative efforts against Dodd-Frank).
26. ANNETTE L. NAZARETH, GABRIEL D. ROSENBERG & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, DAVIS
POLK & WARDWELL LLP, DODD-FRANK’S SEVENTH ANNIVERSARY (July 19, 2017),
https://www.finregreform.com/?s=dodd-frank [https://perma.cc/69TS-XNEF].
27. Alan Pyke, 5 Numbers to Know as Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Celebrates Its
5th Birthday, THINKPROGRESS (July 21, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/5numbers-to-know-as-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-celebrates-its-5th-birthdaye145f4360b7c/ [https://perma.cc/9WU4-EGUU].
28. Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
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transparency. 29 These sites provide an illuminating window into the
financial industry’s activities directed at the regulatory agencies. 30
The lobbying effort dedicated to the rulemaking process took on
many forms. In some cases, lobbyists and law firms organized and
divided up responsibilities for the rulemaking process.
After Dodd-Frank’s passage, lobbyists for the big
banks and industry trade groups divided themselves into
eighteen working groups, each organized around a
different element of the new law. . . . One working group
focused on derivatives reform, including the requirement
that these complex financial instruments now be sold on
open exchanges in the fashion of stocks and bonds.
Another focused on efforts to hammer out the so-called
Volcker Rule, which would limit the ability of federally
insured banks to wager on risky ventures. A third tackled
the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB),
created to protect ordinary consumers from Wall Street

29. See Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Release No. 187-2010, FDIC Announces
Open Door Policy for Regulatory Reform Rulemaking (Aug. 12, 2010),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/pr10187.html [https://perma.cc/7KC9-DR4H]
(announcing FDIC will release the names and affiliations of private sector individuals who
meet with senior FDIC officials to discuss implementing the new law and the subject matter
of those meetings); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Release No. 2010-135, SEC
Chairman Schapiro Announces Open Process for Regulatory Reform Rulemaking (July 27,
2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-135.htm [https://perma.cc/N9KN-7UTJ]
(“[SEC staff] will follow newly-established best practices when holding meetings with
interested parties in order to ensure full transparency to the public.”); Communications With
the
Public,
BD.
OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RES.
SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/communications-with-public.htm
[https://perma.cc/5DVG-DCJ5] (last updated Feb. 14, 2011) (stating Federal Reserve “will be
involved in many rulemakings to implement” Dodd-Frank Act and that “[d]uring the
rulemaking process, meetings will take place between the [Federal Reserve],” the public, and
representatives from banking organizations, and noting that contacts and summaries of
meetings will be posted on webpage).
30. See, e.g., Private Sector Meetings on Financial Reform, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/meetings/ [https://perma.cc/3SA6-GHDB] (last updated
July 8, 2019); Regulatory Reform: Communications with the Public, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RES. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/communications-withpublic.htm [https://perma.cc/5WGW-KB9K] (last updated Feb. 14, 2011); Public Comments
on SEC Regulatory Initiatives Under the Dodd-Frank Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/regreformcomments.shtml
[https://perma.cc/23NE-3HZ4]
(last updated June 21, 2016).
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deceptions involving mortgages, credit cards and other
major profit centers for the banks. 31
Those firms with special expertise or client interest focused on
specific issues rather than attempting to comment on all issues that might
be of interest or importance. This provided an efficient and targeted use
of lobbying resources across a broad spectrum of rules and agencies.
With the incredible resources available to it, the financial industry
was able to approach Congress, regulators, the courts, and the media with
overwhelming force. Lobbyists for financial interests outnumbered those
representing consumer protection interests on Capitol Hill by as much as
twenty-to-one. 32 Like any successful army, the lobbying force was
strongly supported by additional resources intended to magnify its
impact. “The lobbyists are just the point of the spear . . . . There are also
the regulatory lawyers, the research staffs, the PR people and all those
loyal think tank supporters shilling for the banks.” 33
These industry resources were unleashed to meet with the
political leadership and senior professional staff at the regulatory
agencies to try to influence the rule writing process. Following the
publication of proposed rules, interested stakeholders also hired lobbyists
and lawyers to prepare extensive comment letters. Depending on the
underlying issue, these comment letters were often lengthy and addressed
highly complex areas of the proposed regulation. The letters frequently
were not only intended to provide comment on the proposal at hand, but
also to lay the groundwork for a potential legal challenge once the
regulation was finalized. The impact of this strategy is discussed in
greater detail in Part III of this Article. 34
The complexity of many of the proposed rules and the importance
of the public comment process also caused many law and lobbying firms
to engage in a search for talent to ensure that they could provide their
clients with effective representation. Firms sought to hire congressional
and agency staff who had been involved with the passage of the Dodd-

31. Gary Rivlin, How Wall Street Defanged Dodd-Frank, NATION (May 20, 2013),
https://www.thenation.com/article/how-wall-street-defanged-dodd-frank/
[https://perma.cc/LP2S-Q5PE].
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting Ed Mierzwinski, Director of Consumer Programs, U.S. Public Interest
Research Group (“PIRG”)).
34. See infra Part III.
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Frank Act to draw on their expertise. 35 The impact of this “revolving
door” where individuals move between regulators and the financial
industry and vice versa has been the subject of considerable analysis
reaching often differing conclusions. Critics of the revolving door often
focus on the resulting quid pro quo, risk of regulatory capture, or
reputational impacts of former government officials seeking to influence
their colleagues. 36 Others see a more benign but similarly influential
impact of “regulatory schooling” where regulators and industry
participants provide a transfer of knowledge and expertise as they move
between the public and private sector. 37 In either case, proponents of both
schools of thought agree that there are ways to limit any negative effects
35. Jeff Stein, Many Lawmakers and Aides Who Crafted Financial Regulations After the
2008 Crisis Now Work for Wall Street, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2018, 5:02 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/many-lawmakers-and-aids-whocrafted-financial-regulations-after-the-2008-crisis-now-work-for-wallstreet/2018/09/07/50f63a1e-b075-11e8-a20b-5f4f84429666_story.html
[https://perma.cc/KT8M-5TQ7].
36. See, e.g., Elise S. Brezis & Joël Cariolle, Chapter 3: Financial Sector Regulation and
the Revolving Door in US Commercial Banks, in STATE, INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRACY:
CONTRIBUTIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 53–76 (Springer Int’l Pub., Norman Schofield &
Gonzalo Caballero eds., 2016) (“The distortive effects of the revolving door stem from the
concentration of former regulators in a small number of ﬁrms.”); Pedro Nicolaci Da Costa,
How to Break the Wall Street to Washington Merry-Go-Round, FOREIGN POLICY (Dec. 10,
2015, 11:07 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/10/wall-street-to-washington-andback-again-bernanke-revolving-door-federal-reserve/ [https://perma.cc/T4HQ-Q7BE] (“The
revolving door isn’t just unseemly — it’s dangerous.”); Lee Reiners, The Problems with
Crypto’s Revolving Door, AM. BANKER (Oct. 25, 2018, 11:13 AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/the-problems-with-cryptos-revolving-door
[https://perma.cc/8RQE-LZWU] (“A more concerning motive for tapping former regulators
as advisers and directors, is that it lends an aura of legitimacy to a product and industry that
may not be legitimate.”); Lisa Gilbert, Reforming the Financial Services Revolving Door,
HILL, (July 15, 2015, 6:30 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/247962reforming-the-financial-services-revolving-door
[https://perma.cc/9QE2-K2BF]
(“[A]
systemic corruption of government caused by the movement of high-level officials back and
forth between government regulatory positions and the private sector to work in the industry
they formerly regulated.”); Craig Holman, Opinion, A Matter of Trust — Slowing Wall
Street’s Revolving Door, INSIDESOURCES (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.insidesources.com/amatter-of-trust-slowing-wall-streets-revolving-door/ [https://perma.cc/5WHZ-3QEE] (“The
revolving door between Wall Street and Washington once again threatens our nation’s
financial health.”).
37. David Luca, Amit Seru & Francesco Trebbi, The Revolving Door and Worker Flows
in Banking Regulation 4–5 (NBER Working Paper Series, Paper No. 20241, 2014),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w20241 [https://perma.cc/X3A2-3RHX] (“These results appear
inconsistent with a ‘quid-pro-quo’ explanation of the revolving door, but consistent with a
‘regulatory schooling’ hypothesis.”); Brian Wallheimer, Should We Stop the ‘Revolving
Door’?, CHI. BOOTH REV. (Aug. 7, 2017), https://review.chicagobooth.edu/publicpolicy/2017/article/should-we-stop-revolving-door [https://perma.cc/95FT-V3YL] (“Some
findings suggest that regulators are actually tougher on potential employers—and get hired
because private-sector companies want to employ talented people who know the ins and outs
of the regulatory system.”).
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of the revolving door such as recusal requirements and “cooling off”
periods. 38
Because government ethics rules generally limit contact with
former colleagues and establish cooling off periods that significantly
restrict former government officials, 39 the regulatory schooling aspect of
the revolving door seemed to be especially prevalent in the Dodd-Frank
rulemaking process. Without communicating with their prior agencies,
former officials still provided knowledge to their new employers and
clients on how to frame arguments to their prior agencies to provide the
best chance of success in the rulemaking process. Equally important,
they possessed knowledge of what issues within the proposed rule most
concerned the agencies regarding possible legal challenges. This
expertise was often invaluable in shaping comment letters requiring a
detailed agency response in the final rulemaking that might provide the
basis of a successful legal challenge.
In the case of the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
sheer number of required regulatory actions created additional pressure
on the rulemaking activities of the regulatory agencies. As the agencies
38. See Larry D. Wall, The Revolving Door, FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA: NOTES FROM
VAULT (Jan. 2017), https://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/publications/notesfromthevault/01-therevolving-door-2017-01-30.aspx [https://perma.cc/K5TA-WVYH] (“[T]he approach taken to
date has been to seek to mitigate the problem via a set of ethics rules, backed up by outside
monitoring.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-118, LARGE BANK
SUPERVISION: IMPROVED IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL RESERVE POLICIES COULD HELP
MITIGATE THREATS TO INDEPENDENCE 10, passim (2017) (“The potential negative effects of
capture on bank regulation and supervision requires well-designed preventative measures by
prudential banking regulators.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-69, LARGE
BANK SUPERVISION: OCC COULD BETTER ADDRESS RISK OF REGULATORY CAPTURE 4, passim
(2019) (“To respond to risks such as regulatory capture, . . . agencies should apply the
principles of internal control through control activities, including policies and procedures.”).
39. Under 18 U.S.C. § 207, a former federal employee is barred from representing
another person or entity by making a communication to or appearance before a Federal
department, agency, or court concerning the same “particular matter . . . involving specific
parties” (e.g., the same contract or grant) with which the former employee was involved while
serving the Government. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a) (2018). If the matter was pending under the
employee’s official responsibility during the employee’s last year of Government service, the
bar lasts for two years. Id. § 207(a)(2). If the employee participated in the matter “personally
and substantially,” the bar is permanent. Id. § 207(a)(1).
In addition, for a period of one year after leaving a “senior” position, a former senior employee
may not represent another person or entity by making a communication to or appearing before
the former employee’s former agency to seek official action on any matter. Id. § 207(c). A
former “very senior” employee is subject to a similar prohibition, except that the bar lasts for
two years and extends to contacts with specified high-level officials at any department or
agency. Id. § 207(d). Separately, both former senior and very senior employees are prohibited
for one year from representing, aiding, or advising a foreign government or foreign political
party with the intent to influence certain Government officials. Id. § 207(f).
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strove to implement the requirements of the Act, their progress was
constantly monitored and publicized. Many of the rulemaking
requirements in the Act were tied to specific deadlines for
implementation that proved to be unrealistic. When the agencies began
missing their regulatory deadlines, the missed deadlines began to feed a
narrative that the agencies were failing to do their jobs. 40 To counter
progress reports issued by private sources, 41 some agencies began issuing
their own reports on their rulemaking progress. 42 Opponents of the
Dodd-Frank Act seized on this reporting as proof that Congress had
overreached and that the missed deadlines demonstrated that the Act was
collapsing under its own weight. This, in turn, invited congressional
oversight targeted at the delays which affected the agencies’ ability to
focus on the rulemaking as they diverted resources to draft responses to
congressional inquiries, prepare for congressional testimony, and respond
to congressional document requests.
The direct and indirect pressure from various stakeholders and
their lobbyists resulted in slow downs and additional complexity in the
rulemaking that substantially delayed the implementation of the DoddFrank Act. As former Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)
Chairman Sheila Bair said: “This stuff doesn’t get any better with time
. . . . The longer you wait to finalize the rules, the more they get watered
down, the more exceptions that get built in, people’s memories about the
crisis start to fade and the pressure isn’t there.” 43
40. See Kevin McCoy, Dodd-Frank Act: After 3 Years, a Long to-do List, USA TODAY
(June 3, 2013, 8:10 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/06/03/doddfrank-financial-reform-progress/2377603/ [https://perma.cc/85WY-TG9X]; Kevin M.
LaCroix, Dodd-Frank Rulemaking Delays: Bad, and Likely to Get Worse, LEXISNEXIS: LEGAL
NEWSROOM (May 4, 2011), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/banking/b/bankingfinance/posts/dodd-frank-rulemaking-delays-bad-and-likely-to-get-worse
[https://perma.cc/W5XV-WL3T]; Jesse Eisinger & Jake Bernstein, From Dodd-Frank to
Dud: How Financial Reform May Be Going Wrong, PROPUBLICA (June 3, 2011, 8:16 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/from-dodd-frank-to-dud [https://perma.cc/B7J8-UN3E].
In fact, one law firm issued a regular report tracking the rulemaking progress of the agencies,
highlighting the number of missed deadlines and regulations that had yet to be proposed. See
Dodd-Frank
Progress
Report,
DAVIS
POLK
&
WARDWELL
LLP,
https://www.davispolk.com/Dodd-Frank-Rulemaking-Progress-Report
[https://perma.cc/W45H-CYGD] (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank
Progress Report, DAVIS POLK].
41. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Progress Report, DAVIS POLK, supra note 40 (highlighting
agencies’ missed deadlines set by Dodd-Frank Act and regulations yet to be proposed).
42. See Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
[https://perma.cc/N7DM-QDS9] (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
43. McCoy, supra note 40 (quoting Sheila Bair, former Chairman, FDIC).
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III. LITIGATION
Given the extensive rulemaking required to implement the DoddFrank Act and the high stakes for the financial and related industries, it is
not surprising, and was probably inevitable, that opponents would adopt
a litigation strategy. The legal challenges ranged from the sufficiency of
the economic analysis in agency rulemaking to the constitutionality of
many of the Act’s provisions. At every step, interested parties affected
by the Act sought relief in the courts, culminating in a decade of litigation
which not only established the parameters of the Dodd-Frank Act, but
also spilled over into a host of other important legal areas.
A.

Cost-Benefit Analysis Challenges

The rulemaking process was upended just months after the Act
became law by a court decision involving a provision of the Dodd-Frank
Act that arguably was tangential to its core provisions designed to address
the causes of the financial crisis. A year prior to passage of the Act, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) had
decided by a three to two vote 44 to propose a new rule 45 that included
changes to the federal proxy rules to remove impediments
to the exercise of shareholders’ rights to nominate and
elect directors to company boards of directors. The new
rules would require, under certain circumstances, a
company to include in the company’s proxy materials a
shareholder’s, or group of shareholders’, nominees for
director. 46
The proposed rule was an attempt to address a long-standing debate about
“proxy access.” 47
44. Sara Hansard, SEC Commissioners Approve Proposal to Allow Shareholders to
Nominate
Directors,
INVESTMENTNEWS
(May
20,
2009),
https://www.investmentnews.com/sec-commissioners-approve-proposal-to-allowshareholders-to-nominate-directors-21907 [https://perma.cc/3HSH-FRC8].
45. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29024 (proposed June
18, 2009) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
46. Id.
47. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at SEC Open
Meeting on Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (May 20, 2009),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052009mls.htm
[https://perma.cc/6QDW-
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The two dissenting Commissioners questioned whether the SEC
actually had the authority to make such a proposal. 48 This expression of
doubt about the SEC’s legal authority also was raised in public comment
letters. 49 A few months later, Congress included a specific provision in
the Dodd-Frank Act—section 971—to address the issue of authority. 50
Section 971 of the Act provides that:
The Commission may issue rules permitting the use by a
shareholder of proxy solicitation materials supplied by an
issuer of securities for the purpose of nominating
individuals to membership on the board of directors of the
issuer, under such terms and conditions as the
Commission determines are in the interests of
shareholders and for the protection of investors. 51
With this clear grant of statutory authority, the SEC moved ahead
on August 25, 2010, shortly after passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, to
finalize the regulation, making it one of the first regulations promulgated
under the new law. 52 During the Commission’s discussion of the final
UQRK] (“As observers of the Commission will know, this day has been a long time
coming.”).
48. Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting
to Propose Amendments Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (May 20,
2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052009klc.htm [https://perma.cc/UPY4ZYCQ] (“[T]he Commission’s authority to enact these rules is subject to significant doubt
. . .”); Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting to
Propose Amendments Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (May 20,
2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052009tap.htm [https://perma.cc/56BRM2L6] (“The proposal, especially proposed Rule 14a–11 dictating a direct right of access to
the company’s proxy materials, encroaches far too much on internal corporate affairs, the
traditional domain of state corporate law.”).
49. Business Roundtable, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Regarding Facilitating
Shareholder Director Nominations, at 5 (Aug. 17, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s710-09/s71009-267.pdf [https://perma.cc/679D-BWXP] (“In conclusion, we believe that a
federal proxy access right is unnecessary, has serious adverse consequences, and is beyond
the Commission’s authority to adopt.”); Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations, at 2 (Aug. 14, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-181.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TYF5-AY76] (“It is the judgment of the CCMC that the States, not the SEC,
have the authority to act in this realm, through the traditional usage of state corporate law.”).
50. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
971(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78n note (2018).
51. Id.
52. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56668, 56669 (Sept. 16,
2010) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). But see Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144,
1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (invalidating SEC Rule 14a–11).
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rule, both dissenting Commissioners abandoned the argument that the
Commission lacked the authority to promulgate the rule in light of the
congressional action and instead were deeply critical of the economic
analysis underlying the rule, questioning whether it adequately balanced
the costs and benefits of the final rule and whether it fairly considered
contrary analyses. 53
The criticism by the dissenting Commissioners of the economic
analysis raised a particular red flag for the SEC. Unlike the banking
regulators that are not required to perform an economic analysis as part
of their rulemaking, the SEC was statutorily required to consider a rule’s
impact on “efficiency, competition, and capital formation (‘ECCF’).” 54
A string of cases 55 had evolved such that courts had essentially held that
Congress had imposed on “the SEC an obligation to consider the
economic implications of certain rules it proposes” 56 through this
53. Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting
to Adopt Amendments Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Aug. 25,
2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510klc.htm [https://perma.cc/44GXV2VN] (“I am not satisfied that the Commission has seriously considered the true costs to
issuers and our capital markets of imposing a new federal proxy access right, nor weighed
these costs against the anticipated benefits, which appear to be speculative at best and to
depend largely on the inestimable benefits of improved ‘investor confidence.’”); Troy A.
Paredes, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt the Final
Rule Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (“Proxy Access”) (Aug. 25,
2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510tap.htm [https://perma.cc/DN89KV4K] (“To my mind, the adopting release’s treatment of the economic studies is not
evenhanded.”).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2018) (“Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the Commission
is engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition
to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.”); § 78c(f) (“Whenever pursuant to this chapter the Commission is engaged
in rulemaking, or in the review of a rule of a self-regulatory organization, and is required to
consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the
Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action
will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”); § 78w(a)(2) (“The
Commission and the Secretary of the Treasury, in making rules and regulations pursuant to
any provisions of this chapter, shall consider among other matters the impact any such rule or
regulation would have on competition. The Commission and the Secretary of the Treasury
shall not adopt any such rule or regulation which would impose a burden on competition not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.”); § 80a-2(c)
(“Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is
required to consider or determine whether an action is consistent with the public interest, the
Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action
will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”).
55. See Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chamber
of Commerce v. SEC (Chamber II), 443 F.3d 890 (D.C Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v.
SEC (Chamber I), 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
56. E.g., Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 178.
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statutory requirement. 57 However, as one commenter pointed out, what
constitutes the proper extent of
consider[ation given to the] ECCF factors is a matter of
judgment—one that can and should vary significantly
depending upon the rule and its context. No matter how
much analysis the SEC undertakes, a court can always
point to an additional issue that should have been
analyzed, or analyzed differently or more deeply. 58
Just months after President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act
into law, a panel of the D.C. Circuit issued a harsh opinion in Business
Roundtable v. SEC, 59 invalidating the SEC’s new proxy access rule (Rule
14a–11) 60 as “arbitrary and capricious” under the APA. 61 The court
found that “the Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed
the costs and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain
costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified; neglected to
support its predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to respond
to substantial problems raised by commenters.” 62 The panel went on to
establish a seemingly new standard of review in determining that the SEC
had failed to demonstrate that the proposed rule would result in a “net
benefit.” 63
Although many commenters have criticized the decision and
reasoning in Business Roundtable, 64 it appeared to validate a narrative
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2018).
58. Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30

YALE J. ON REG., 289, 303 (2013).
59. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
60. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56667, 56669 (Sept. 16,
2010) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
61. Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), Pub. L. No. 79–404, §10(e), 60 Stat. 237,
243–44 (1946).
62. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148–49. Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg, who wrote the
decision, was a former Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
which is responsible for reviewing all rules promulgated by government agencies other than
independent agencies, including their cost-benefit analyses.
63. Id. at 1153.
64. Jill E. Fisch, The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC
Rulemaking, 36 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 695, 697–98 (2013) (“[T]he Business Roundtable decision
was itself flawed. In evaluating the SEC’s decision to adopt a proxy access rule, the D.C.
Circuit completely disregarded the congressional policy judgments reflected in DoddFrank.”); see also Kraus & Raso, supra note 58, at 303; Jonathan D. Guynn, The Political
Economy of Financial Rulemaking After Business Roundtable, 99 VA. L. REV. 64 (2013);
James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C.
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that opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act had been attempting to establish
for several months. At the first hearing on the implementation of the Act
in February 2011, opponents expressed concern that, “[i]n the rush to
comply with the unrealistic deadlines set in Dodd-Frank, the regulators
have had to focus on speed rather than deliberation.” 65 They argued that
the speed of the process was undermining the integrity of the rulemaking
and that this, along with the sheer number of rulemakings required by the
Act, was stifling public participation. 66
Reflecting the views of the opponents, Senator Richard Shelby
also argued that the rush to implement the rules under the Dodd-Frank
Act was undermining the quality of the economic analysis essential to
proper rulemaking:
Another consequence of the hasty rulemaking
process is that our regulators may not be properly
conducting economic analysis of proposed rules. Any
thorough consideration of a proposed rule obviously
should include an understanding of its cost.
Unfortunately, there are serious questions regarding the
willingness and ability of our regulators to conduct such
an analysis. In light of the fact that the cost imposed by
these rules may cause some Americans to lose their jobs,
our regulatory agencies should, at the very least, make
themselves aware of the economic impact of proposed
rules before adopting them. 67
With this opening shot, opponents served notice that they would
attempt to wield economic analysis as a weapon in the ongoing
implementation debate.
However, not all of the financial regulators had similar
requirements to perform cost-benefit analyses. As previously mentioned,
Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811 (2012); Recent
Case, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 1088
(2012).
65. Oversight of Dodd-Frank Implementation: A Progress Report by the Regulators at
the Half-Year Mark: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th
Cong.
3
(2011)
(statement
of
Sen.
Richard
C.
Shelby),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112shrg65718/pdf/CHRG-112shrg65718.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J8Z2-4TVD].
66. Id.
67. Id.
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the SEC was required to consider efficiency, competition, and capital
formation in its rulemaking, 68 and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”) had similar statutory requirements mandated by
section 15(a) of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974, 69 amending the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”). 70 In addition,
the Dodd-Frank Act required the CFPB to consider the potential benefits
and costs of its rulemakings. 71 The Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) (hereinafter the
“Federal Banking Regulators”) were not under similar statutory
mandates. Dodd-Frank opponents nevertheless frequently point to
section 302 of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act 72 in attempting to argue that the Federal Banking
Regulators are covered by an analogous statutory obligation. 73
Although not every agency charged with implementing the DoddFrank Act had statutory obligations to conduct cost-benefit analyses,
there were enough requirements for opponents of the Act to press the
issue. For instance, the House Agriculture Committee sent a request to
68. See supra note 54.
69. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389

(1974).
70. Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) § 15(a), 7 U.S.C. § 19(a) (2018) (“Before
promulgating a regulation under this chapter . . . the Commission shall consider the costs and
benefits of the action of the Commission.”).
71. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1022(b)(2)(a)(i), 12 U.S.C § 5512(b)(2)(a)(i) (2018) (“In prescribing a rule under the Federal
consumer financial laws, the Bureau shall consider the potential benefits and costs to
consumers and covered persons, including the potential reduction of access by consumers to
consumer financial products or services resulting from such rule . . . .”).
72. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103325, § 302, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4802).
73. Section 302 of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement
Act of 1994, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4802, provides that:
In determining the effective date and administrative compliance
requirements for new regulations that impose additional reporting,
disclosure, or other requirements on insured depository institutions, each
Federal banking agency shall consider, consistent with the principles of
safety and soundness and the public interest—(1) any administrative
burdens that such regulations would place on depository institutions,
including small depository institutions and customers of depository
institutions; and (2) the benefits of such regulations.
Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act § 302, 12 U.S.C. § 4802
(2018) (emphasis added). It is worth noting that, contrary to assertions that this statutory
language creates a broad obligation for the federal banking agencies to conduct cost-benefit
analyses for rulemakings, the introductory clause (emphasized above) makes clear that this
requirement is specifically limited.
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the CFTC Inspector General (“CFTC IG”) to review whether the CFTC
had met the cost-benefit requirements of section 15(a) of the CEA in its
promulgation of four new rules required by the Dodd-Frank Act. The
CFTC IG subsequently issued a report that was critical of the agency’s
rulemaking process. 74 The CFTC IG’s report found that “it appears the
[CFTC] generally adopted a ‘one size fits all’ approach to section 15(a)
compliance without giving significant regard to the deliberations
addressing idiosyncratic cost and benefit issues that were shaping each
rule, and were often addressed in the preamble.” 75 The CFTC IG went
on to find that “it appears that the economic factors considered and
embraced or rejected during the course of constructing the rule were not
included in the cost-benefit analysis, and instead the cost-benefit analysis
was given an homogenized treatment.” 76
Shortly after the CFTC IG issued its report, the Republican
Senators on the Senate Banking Committee jointly sent letters to the
Inspectors General (“IG”) of the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, SEC, and
CFTC, asking them also to review the economic analyses performed by
their respective agencies in proposing and adopting regulations under the
Dodd-Frank Act. 77 The IG responses were sent to the Senators in midJune 2011. Although the IG reports found that “the agencies largely
followed the statutory and other requirements applicable to their
rulemaking and related economic analysis,” 78 they formulated enough
recommendations to provide additional ammunition for opponents. One
Senator stated:

74. See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
AN INVESTIGATION REGARDING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES PERFORMED BY THE COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION IN CONNECTION WITH RULEMAKINGS UNDERTAKEN PURSUANT
TO THE DODD-FRANK ACT: REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 21 (2011).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Mike Crapo, Senators: Are the Costs of Dodd-Frank Being Counted?: Banking
Committee Republicans Ask Inspectors General to Review Economic Analysis, MIKE CRAPO:
NEWSROOM/NEWS
RELEASES
(May
9,
2011),
https://www.crapo.senate.gov/media/newsreleases/senators-are-the-costs-of-dodd-frankbeing-countedd [https://perma.cc/VQ5E-N46B] (“The April Inspector General report raises a
number of troubling issues with the cost benefit analysis being done by the CFTC and today
we are requesting that the Inspectors General review the economic analyses performed by the
Dodd-Frank regulators.”).
78. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 12-151, DODD-FRANK ACT
REGULATIONS: IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND
COORDINATION 14 (2011).
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The IG reports highlight the fact that there are no uniform
cost-benefit requirements for our financial regulators that
focus on economic growth, job creation, or
competitiveness. The regulators need to conduct rigorous
analyses of the costs and benefits of their rules and the
effects those rules could have on the economy. 79
Another Senator said that “[t]he [IG] reports deepened my
concern that the regulatory agencies charged with implementing DoddFrank are not undertaking the type of economic analysis that is necessary
to reveal how Dodd-Frank will affect our economy.” 80
When the court decided Business Roundtable v. SEC 81 a month
later, it seemed to confirm the concerns expressed by Dodd-Frank Act
opponents in Congress that the economic analysis backing the
rulemaking was flawed. Senator Richard Shelby, the Ranking Minority
Member of the Senate Banking Committee argued:
This decision is an unequivocal validation of the concerns
that Republicans have raised repeatedly over the past
year. Our regulatory agencies are not undertaking
rigorous and deliberate analysis to understand the
economic impacts of their actions. This cavalier
approach to their job is particularly damaging at a time of
painfully high unemployment when American businesses
face hundreds of forthcoming rules mandated by the
Dodd-Frank Act. This is just the latest in a series of SEC
reprimands and confirms the need for Congressional
action. 82
Congressional action would soon follow on both the oversight and
legislative fronts.
79. Mike Crapo, Crapo, Shelby Concerned by IG Reports on Dodd-Frank
Implementation, MIKE CRAPO: NEWSROOM/NEWS RELEASES (June 16, 2011),
https://www.crapo.senate.gov/media/newsreleases/crapo-shelby-concerned-by-ig-reportson-dodd-frank-implementation [https://perma.cc/ZZB4-WAWR].
80. Id.
81. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
82. Richard Shelby, Shelby, Crapo: Further Evidence of Careless Rulemaking, RICHARD
SHELBY:
NEWS
RELEASES
(July
22,
2011),
https://www.shelby.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/newsreleases?ID=D5998BF5-9D64-4254B593-E519DDD67D94 [https://perma.cc/TY7Y-ARBV].
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With Republicans in control of the House of Representatives in
the 112th Congress starting in January 2011, multiple House committees
and subcommittees stepped up their oversight of rulemaking under the
Dodd-Frank Act. As a result, agencies were required increasingly to
spend time justifying their rule proposals and economic analyses to
Congress. For example, at a congressional hearing titled The SEC’s
Aversion to Cost-Benefit Analysis, 83 SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro
defended her agency’s rulemaking practices and unveiled new internal
guidance for producing future economic analyses. 84 Just over a week
later, she appeared on Capitol Hill again to testify on the same topic. 85
In addition to initiating time-consuming oversight hearings,
Members of Congress also introduced legislation seeking to embed
additional cost-benefit requirements in law. Representative Scott Garrett,
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets and
Government Sponsored Enterprises, introduced the SEC Regulatory
Accountability Act. 86 The initial bill required that the SEC “propose or
adopt a regulation or order only on a reasoned determination that the
benefits of the intended regulation or order justify the costs.” 87 In
addition, the bill added a list of additional “considerations” the SEC may
take into account as part of its analysis of the costs and benefits of a
proposed regulation or order. 88 By requiring the benefits in favor of the
regulation to outweigh the costs, the bill converted cost-benefit analysis
from an analytical tool for rule development into a threshold requirement.
In testimony on the proposed legislation, Chairman Schapiro
detailed the impact that the proposed legislation would have on SEC
rulemaking:
83. The SEC’s Aversion to Cost-Benefit Analysis, COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T
REFORM (Apr. 17, 2012), https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/hearing/the-secs-aversionto-cost-benefit-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/U7ZV-9V7P].
84. Testimony Concerning Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking: Hearing Before the
H. Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs. & Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs of the Oversight
& Gov’t Reform Comm., 112th Cong. 1–17 (2012) (statement of Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman,
U.S.
Sec.
&
Exch.
Comm’n),
https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2012/04/4-17-12-Schapiro-Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6SZ-2A2B].
85. Oversight of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th
Cong. 52–66 (2012) (statement of Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg75091/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg75091.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X6ZA-4YXP].
86. SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 2308, 112th Cong. (2011).
87. Id. § 2.
88. Id.

22

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 24

The bill enumerates eleven new factors for the SEC to
consider in its economic analysis, each of which would
create a new potential challenge to future rules.
Moreover, a number of these new factors are potentially
in conflict with the SEC’s mission, duplicative of existing
requirements, unrelated to SEC rulemaking, or unclear in
scope. For example, the bill’s direction to “assess the best
ways of protecting market participants” could conflict
with the SEC’s mission. The SEC’s mission is to protect
investors, which in some cases means protecting them
from certain market participants. 89
She also pointed out that the bill extended these requirements beyond
rulemaking to include agency orders, resulting in a need for a cost-benefit
analysis whenever the SEC sought to bring an enforcement order. 90
As the bill was amended and reported to the full House for
consideration, 91 its purpose became clearer. Recognizing the political
peril of requiring cost-benefit analyses for enforcement orders, the
amended version of the bill limited its requirements to “orders of general
applicability.” 92 However, in almost every other respect, the bill layered
on additional requirements that were more prescriptive than the original
version. The bill also was amended to require that the SEC “shall”
consider certain factors, where the original version merely said the SEC
“may” consider them. 93 In addition, it required the SEC to assess the
costs and benefits of a proposed rule and “choose the approach that
maximizes net benefits.” 94 Similarly, the amended bill required the SEC
to “evaluate whether, consistent with obtaining regulatory objectives, the
regulation is tailored to impose the least burden on society, including
market participants, individuals, businesses of differing sizes, and other

89. Testimony on “Fixing the Watchdog: Legislative Proposals to Improve and Enhance
the Securities and Exchange Commission”: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
112th Cong. 134 (2011) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72603/pdf/CHRG112hhrg72603.pdf [https://perma.cc/BM75-SFRG].
90. Id.
91. H.R. 2308 § 2 (2011) (as amended).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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entities.” 95 By requiring subjective determinations through the specific
language used, such as “maximizes” or “least burden,” the bill guaranteed
that any rule could be subject to a subsequent legal challenge, and that
any court could substitute its judgment for that of the agency. The bill
also added a host of post-adoption requirements 96 that could trigger an
endless stream of additional legal challenges, even if the original proposal
was successfully promulgated. Although two versions of the bill would
pass the House, one in the 113th Congress 97 and another in the 115th
Congress, 98 the Senate never considered the legislation.
The effort to add cost-benefit criteria in agency rulemaking
through legislation was also reflected in the introduction of the Financial
Regulatory Responsibility Act (“FRRA”) 99 by Senator Shelby. The
FRRA included many of the requirements found in the SEC Regulatory
Accountability Act, 100 but the FRRA would have applied them to all of
the federal financial regulators. 101 However, the FRRA also would have
prohibited an agency from issuing a regulation if it “determine[d] that the
quantified costs [were] greater than the quantified benefits.” 102 In
essence, this provision would have permitted a financial regulator to
nullify a provision of law duly passed by Congress and signed by the
President if it determined that the costs outweighed the benefits—that is,
unless Congress voted to override the agency’s judgment and allow the
rule to go forward. 103
The bill also enhanced its cost-benefit requirements by including
a new judicial review requirement that expanded the standing to legally
challenge a rule promulgated by a financial regulator to any “person that
is adversely affected or aggrieved by the regulation. 104 Additionally, it
established a statutory standard of review by including a requirement that
the court shall vacate any rule where the court finds that the agency did
not comply with the cost-benefit provisions of the bill, 105 inviting the
court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency in any rulemaking.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
See, e.g., id.
SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 1062, 113th Cong. (2013).
SEC Regulatory Act, H.R. 78, 115th Cong. (2017).
Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act, S. 1615, 112th Cong. (2011).
SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 2308, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
S. 1615 § 2.
Id. § 3(b)(4).
Id.
Id. § 8(a).
Id. § 8(c).
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The judicial review elements of the bill also demonstrated conclusively
that the legislation went far beyond the prior Executive Orders regarding
agency cost-benefit analyses that the bill’s supporters claimed they were
simply trying to memorialize in statute. While the bill created new
standards of judicial review, the prior Executive Orders explicitly did not
create new legal rights enforceable by the courts. 106 Ultimately, the bill
was never considered by the Senate.
In a third bill focused on cost-benefit analysis, Senator Rob
Portman introduced the Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act
(“IARAA”). 107 Taking a slightly different approach, the IARAA
authorized the President to issue an Executive Order to require specified
elements in their economic analyses for all independent federal
agencies. 108 The Executive Order contemplated by the bill also would
require all independent regulatory agencies to submit their proposed
regulations to the Office and Management and Budget’s (“OMB”) Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) for review. 109 If OIRA
determined that the agency had not satisfied the requirements of the
Executive Order, the agency would have to respond to OIRA’s
criticisms. 110 Although the bill included language that “the compliance
or noncompliance of an independent regulatory agency with the
requirements of an Executive Order issued under this Act shall not be
subject to judicial review[,]” 111 the bill also required that OIRA’s analysis
be made part of the rulemaking public record. 112

106. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41585, 41587–88 (July 14, 2011)
(“This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its
departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.”);
Exec.
Order
No.
12866,
58
Fed.
Reg.
51735
(Oct.
4,
1993),
https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8M7J-QKX4] (“Nothing in this Executive order shall affect any otherwise
available judicial review of agency action. This Executive order is intended only to improve
the internal management of the Federal Government and does not create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States,
its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.”).
107. Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act (“IARAA”), S. 3468, 112th Cong.
(2012).
108. Id. § 3(a).
109. Id. § 3(c).
110. Id. § 3(c)(3).
111. Id. § 4(a).
112. Id. § 4(b) (requiring inclusion of the OIRA analysis within the rulemaking record
provides an opportunity for a court to give deference to the OIRA review in its review of the
underlying cost-benefit analysis).
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The prospects for passage of the IARAA spurred the heads of the
federal financial regulators to write the Senate sponsors, warning them
that the bill “would give any President unprecedented authority to
influence the policy and rulemaking functions of independent regulatory
agencies and would constitute a fundamental change in the role of
independent regulatory agencies.” 113 As the agency heads recognized,
the new bill escalated well beyond an effort to impose new requirements
on cost-benefit analyses subject to judicial review, instead presenting an
existential threat that “would undermine the independence of the
independent agencies and, and with it, their ability to do their jobs.” 114
Although none of the bills described above were enacted into law,
they were introduced and debated in several subsequent Congresses, and
the debate on precisely what cost-benefit requirements should be applied
to financial regulators continued.
In March 2019, the Trump
Administration added a new element to the debate when it issued
guidance 115 to require independent agencies to submit their regulations to
OMB, ostensibly for review for compliance with the Congressional
Review Act. 116 The Congressional Review Act requires that “major
rules” be submitted to Congress before they take effect, 117 and the OMB
guidance on its face establishes a process for OIRA to determine whether
a proposed regulation constitutes a “major rule” under the statute. 118
However, the OMB guidance also effectively requires independent
agencies to perform cost-benefit analyses under OIRA standards and
submit them and any proposed rule to OIRA for review prior to issuing a
new regulation or guidance. 119 By leveraging the requirements of the
Congressional Review Act, OMB appears to be attempting to achieve
113. Letter from federal financial regulators to U.S. Senators Joseph Lieberman & Susan
Collins
(Oct.
26,
2012),
https://www.foreffectivegov.org/sites/default/files/regs/financial_regulators_ltr_lieberman_c
ollins_s3468.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VEP-BAC4].
114. Teresa Tritch, Making Independent Agencies Less Independent, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION
(Nov. 6, 2012, 5:44 PM), https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/06/makingindependent-agencies-less-independent/ [https://perma.cc/36YM-ZUBD].
115. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM
FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES: GUIDANCE ON COMPLIANCE
WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 2–4 (Apr. 11, 2019) [hereinafter OMB GUIDANCE
MEMORANDUM],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/M-19-14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CAY9-WGS6].
116. Congressional Review Act (“CRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847, 868–74
(1996).
117. Id.; see also infra Part IV.F.
118. OMB GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM, supra note 115, passim.
119. Id.
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many of the same results of the IARAA without Congress passing the
bill. If the independent agencies accede to the OMB guidance, it will
give the Executive Branch unprecedented control over the rulemaking
activities of the independent financial regulatory agencies. 120 The impact
of the new guidance and the willingness of the independent financial
regulators to accept its limitations remains an open question.
Few issues had a greater impact on rulemaking under the DoddFrank Act than the many issues surrounding the supporting economic
analyses. Rules were delayed as agencies put additional resources and
time into refining their economic analyses. 121 In addition, as mentioned
above, some of the agencies established formal policies to support the
economic analysis in their rulemakings 122 with some evidence that the
new policies were producing economic analyses that were more

120. Hal S. Scott, OMB’s Guidance Memorandum to Independent Agencies, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(June
26,
2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/26/ombs-guidance-memorandum-to-independentagencies/ [https://perma.cc/PQ6J-Y2MX] (“[The OMB Guidance Memorandum] could be
read to require, for the first time, that independent financial regulatory agencies (‘IFRAs’)
conduct a cost-benefit analysis under OIRA methodology of all proposed rules, and that such
analysis be reviewed by OIRA.”); William Funk, OMB Leveraging the CRA to Add to Its
Oversight of Independent Regulatory Agencies, YALE J. ON REG. (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://yalejreg.com/nc/omb-leveraging-the-cra-to-add-to-its-oversight-of-independentregulatory-agencies-by-william-funk/ [https://perma.cc/26CK-AX3F] (noting that OMB is
effectively applying the same cost-benefit standards that it requires for executive agencies to
independent agencies by claiming that the only way it can make the major rule determination
is to have independent regulatory agencies engage in essentially the same procedures as
executive agencies with respect to the adoption of final rules and guidance); accord OMB
GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM, supra note 115, passim.
121. Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. SEC Looks to Economists for Legal Cover, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 16,
2012),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2012-04-16-sns-rt-sececonomicanalysisl2e8fg6xg-20120416-story.html [https://perma.cc/A6HN-5SGJ] (“Since the SEC’s
proxy access rule was overturned, the pace of Dodd-Frank rulemaking at the agency has
slowed considerably.”).
122. E.g., Memorandum from Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation
(“RSFI”) & Office of the General Counsel (“OGC”), U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, on Current
Guidance on Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemakings, to Staff of the Rulewriting Divisions
and
Offices,
U.S.
Sec.
&
Exch.
Comm’n
(Mar.
16,
2012),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RZ5A-YDCE]; Statement of Policy on the Development and Review of
Regulations and Policies, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., (last updated Apr. 30, 2018),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-400.html
[https://perma.cc/XVL9M9EX]; U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL, AN INVESTIGATION REGARDING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES PERFORMED BY THE
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION IN CONNECTION WITH RULEMAKINGS
UNDERTAKEN
PURSUANT
TO
THE
DODD-FRANK
ACT
21
(2011),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/oig_in
vestigation_041511.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK58-MMAP].
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defensible in the courts. 123 Joint agency rulemakings were especially
difficult because each agency needed to satisfy their individual
rulemaking and analysis requirements. Opponents of specific rules laid
the groundwork for legal challenges through detailed comment letters
that raised a multitude of potential impacts, cost considerations, and
alternative approaches, forcing the agencies to respond to all of them or
otherwise risk having their rulemaking judged “arbitrary and capricious”
under the APA. 124 Agencies governed by boards and commissions now
found minority members routinely challenging the economic analyses
underlying their rule proposals, providing a boost to legal challenges.
The ultimate impact of the focus on economic analysis in
promulgating regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act remains the subject
of considerable debate. Some commentators have expressed concern that
legal and judicial requirements for economic analysis have created an
environment where rulemaking is unnecessarily delayed or extremely
difficult to successfully accomplish, resulting in undesirable
consequences, such as delay, unending legal challenges, and rulemaking
by enforcement. 125 Others have argued that the focus on economic
analysis has been appropriate and has resulted in better, more effective
regulations that properly take into account the impact on the public. 126 In
123. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[W]e find it
difficult to see what the Commission could have done better.”).
124. Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018) (“[In reviewing
an agency action, t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions of law found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with the law . . . .”); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State
Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–44 (1983) (establishing multi-factor test agencies must
satisfy to successfully defend arbitrary and capricious challenges).
125. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case
Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 882 (2015) (“[P]recise, reliable, quantified
CBA remains unfeasible.”); Donna M. Nagy, The Costs of Mandatory Cost-Benefit Analysis
in SEC Rulemaking, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 129, 159–60 (2015) (“[T]he costs of such mandatory
analysis in SEC rulemaking include: SEC paralysis, new investor-driven challenges to
deregulatory initiatives, an increasing tendency for regulation by enforcement, a greater
penchant for informal and unofficial rulemaking by the SEC staff, and fewer congressional
delegations of authority or discretion to the SEC.”).
126. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85
U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 935–43 (2018) (arguing that the regulators’ cost-benefit analyses were
defective and the courts were right to require the agencies to show that their regulations passed
an adequate cost-benefit analysis); Jerry Ellig, Improvements in SEC Economic Analysis Since
Business Roundtable: A Structured Assessment 7, 48 (Mercantus Center, George Mason
University,
Mercatus
Working
Paper,
2016),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mercatus-ellig-sec-business-roundtable-v1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E8M7-4SGJ] (“[J]udicial review can prompt a regulatory agency to produce
higher-quality analysis and to provide a more complete explanation of how that analysis
affected its decisions.”).
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either case, the debate over economic analysis became one of the defining
backdrops for implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act over the past
decade and has more broadly shaped administrative law for years to
come.
B.

Constitutional Challenges

1. The “Kitchen Sink” Strategy: State National Bank of Big Spring v.
Lew
The broadest constitutional challenge to the Dodd-Frank Act and
the rules promulgated thereunder was brought by a relatively small
national bank in Texas which included a wide range of legal challenges.
In State National Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 127 the bank challenged the
constitutionality of: (1) Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act, which established
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”); 128 (2) Title II of the
Act, which established the Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”); 129
and (3) Title X, which established the CFPB. 130 For good measure, the
bank also challenged the constitutionality of the recess appointment of
the CFPB Director. 131 Ultimately, the bank was joined in the suit by the
Attorneys General of eleven states. 132
In arguing that Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act was
unconstitutional, the plaintiffs contended that it violated the nondelegation doctrine 133 and separation of powers principles based on the
127. State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 795 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
128. Id. at 52, 54–55; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection

Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2018) (establishing FSOC).
129. State Nat’l Bank, 795 F.3d at 52, 55–57; see also Dodd-Frank § 204, 12 U.S.C. §
5384 (2018) (establishing necessary authority and providing purpose and procedure for
orderly liquidation of covered financial institutions).
130. State Nat’l Bank, 795 F.3d at 51, 53–54; see also Dodd-Frank § 1011, 12 U.S.C. §
5491 (2018) (establishing Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, commonly known as
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau or CFPB); Dodd-Frank § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511
(2018) (providing purpose, objectives, and functions of CFPB).
131. State Nat’l Bank, 795 F.3d at 52.
132. Those eleven states whose Attorneys General joined in the suit were Alabama,
Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas,
and West Virginia. See id. at 50–51.
133. The non-delegation doctrine is the principle that Congress cannot delegate its
legislative powers to agencies, thereby preserving the separation of powers between the
executive and legislative branches. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 458
(2001) (“When conferring decisionmaking authority upon agencies, Congress must lay down
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform.”
(citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))).
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Act’s broad grant of authority to FSOC to designate institutions as
systemically important financial institutions (“SIFI”), thereby subjecting
them to enhanced government oversight. 134 Given that the bank was not
a nonbank financial company, as defined by the statute, and that banks
are specifically exempt from the provisions of Title I, the bank argued
instead that it had standing because it was harmed competitively by
FSOC’s designation of GE Capital as a SIFI. 135 Writing for a unanimous
panel, then-Judge Kavanaugh found “the link between (i) the enhanced
regulation of GE Capital, (ii) any alleged reputational benefit to GE
Capital, and (iii) any harm to State National Bank is simply too attenuated
and speculative to show the causation necessary to support standing.” 136
The constitutional challenges to Title II were based on the State
plaintiffs’ claim as possible creditors of future financial companies
potentially subject to the Dodd-Frank Act’s OLA provisions. The States
argued that they had suffered a loss of statutory rights they previously
enjoyed under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. They contended that they
could suffer future harm based on the provisions of OLA that permitted
the FDIC to treat similarly situated creditors differently under certain
circumstances than the uniform treatment they would receive under
bankruptcy. Again, the court determined that the claims failed on
standing and ripeness grounds, given that the claim did not involve the
actual application of Title II and was based on a set of highly speculative
preconditions before the States could demonstrate that they had been
harmed. 137 Judge Kavanaugh wrote: “It is premature for a court to
consider the legality of how the Government might wield the orderly
liquidation authority in a potential future proceeding.” 138 The court also
noted that, “[i]f the State plaintiffs are injured at some point in the future
by a liquidation or reorganization under the Government’s orderly
liquidation authority, the State plaintiffs can seek to raise their
134. State Nat’l Bank, 795 F.3d at 52, 54–55; see also, e.g., Dodd-Frank § 112, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5322(a)(1)(A) (2018) (“The purposes of the [FSOC] are . . . to identify risks to the financial
stability of the United States that could arise from the material financial distress or failure, or
ongoing activities, of large, interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial
companies, or that could arise outside the financial services marketplace . . . .”).
135. The bank contended that GE Capital’s designation as a SIFI provided it a competitive
advantage over the bank because investors might perceive GE Capital, as a SIFI, to be safer
due to the possibility of government backing and enhanced supervision. State Nat’l Bank,
795 F.3d at 55.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 56.
138. Id.
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constitutional arguments then, as the Government acknowledges.” 139 Yet
some commentators have noted that because plaintiffs cannot challenge
OLA in advance of its use, which will be by definition in an emergency
situation, the decision “raises serious doubts about the viability of OLA
challenges.” 140
The remaining constitutional challenges to the Dodd-Frank Act
in State National Bank of Big Spring involved the CFPB. 141 The plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of the structure of the CFPB as an
independent agency under a single Director. 142 The plaintiffs also
challenged the constitutionality of the recess appointment of CFPB’s
Director. 143 Unlike the other constitutional challenges in the case, the
D.C. Circuit reversed the district court, determined that the plaintiffs did
have standing to raise the constitutionality of the structure of the CFPB
and the appointment of its Director and remanded the case. 144
On remand, the district court was forced to consider the issue of
the constitutionality of the recess appointment where the Director
ultimately had been confirmed by the Senate while the case was working
its way through the courts. 145 Subsequent to his confirmation, Director
Cordray ratified the actions he had taken during his recess appointment.
The court determined that the ratification “saves the regulations from
plaintiff’s challenge.” 146
2. Independent Agency Structure: The CFPB Line of Cases
The constitutional challenge to the structure of the CFPB raised
in State National Bank of Big Spring was addressed by another case: PHH
Corp. v. CFPB. 147 In that case, the CFPB brought charges against PHH
Corp., a large mortgage lender, for violations under the Real Estate
139. Id.
140. Recent Case, State National Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 795 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir.

2015), 129 HARV. L. REV. 835, 841 (2016).
141. State Nat’l Bank, 795 F.3d at 51–52.
142. Id. at 51.
143. Id. at 52.
144. Id. at 57.
145. President Obama re-nominated Richard Cordray as Director of the CFPB on January
24, 2013, and he was confirmed by the Senate on July 16, 2013.
146. State Nat’l Bank, No. 12-1032 ESH (D.D.C. 2016) (order and judgment of D.C.
District
Court
on
remand
from
D.C.
Circuit
Court
of
Appeals),
https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/18-307-opinion-below.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YGQ7-XTV4].
147. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
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Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”). 148 In his decision to bring
charges, the CFPB Director read the statute to support a broader finding
of misconduct than the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who had heard
the case. Consequently, the Director significantly increased the
disgorgement from the $6.4 million recommended by the ALJ to $109
million. PHH Corp., among other issues, challenged the constitutionality
of the structure of the CFPB with a sole Director, with a five-year term
in office, subject to removal by the President only for “inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 149 Specifically, PHH Corp.
asserted that this structure was inconsistent with Article II of the
Constitution that vests executive power in the President. 150
A splintered D.C. Circuit, hearing the case en banc, rejected PHH
Corp.’s challenge and found that the “for cause” removal protections for
the CFPB Director are consistent with other independent regulatory
agencies, 151 that the functions of the CFPB are not core executive
functions, 152 and noted that such provisions had been consistently
provided to independent financial regulators. 153 In his dissent, thenJudge Kavanaugh argued that prior independent agency precedents
required that independent agencies have multi-member structures to pass
constitutional muster. 154 Neither party sought Supreme Court review.
The constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure as an independent
financial regulatory agency with a sole Director continues to generate
legal challenges. In CFPB v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 155 the Southern
District of New York rejected the en banc decision of the D.C. Circuit in
PHH Corp. v. CFPB, and adopted the reasoning in Judge Kavanaugh’s
dissent that the CFPB is unconstitutional “because it is an independent
agency that exercises substantial executive power and is headed by a

148. Id. at 76–84; see Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat.
1724 (1974) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–17); 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (2018).
149. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1011(c)(3), 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2018); see PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 79–80, 84.
150. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 79–80, 84; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
151. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 80 (“Because we see no constitutional defect in Congress’s
choice to bestow on the CFPB Director protection against removal except for ‘inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,’ we sustain it.”).
152. Id. (“Wide margins separate the validity of an independent CFPB from any
unconstitutional effort to attenuate presidential control over core executive functions.”).
153. Id. (“Congress and the President have historically countenanced sole-headed
financial regulatory bodies.”).
154. Id. at 165 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
155. CFPB v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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single Director.” 156 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is considering a
case out of the Southern District of Mississippi, CFPB v. All American
Check Cashing, 157 where a company engaged in payday lending is
challenging the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure in an
enforcement action. 158 In a similar case, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Collins v. Mnuchin 159 found the structure of the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) unconstitutional by distinguishing it
from the CFPB. 160 In that case, the court hightlighted that FSOC has
authority to act as a check on CFPB rulemaking, whereas the FHFA has
no similar oversight authority. 161
3. The Pending Supreme Court Decision: CFPB v. Seila Law
In October 2019, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case out of
the Ninth Circuit, CFPB v. Seila Law. 162 In that case, the CFPB is seeking
to enforce a law firm’s compliance with a civil investigative demand.
Among other defenses, the law firm challenged the constitutionality of
the CFPB’s structure. Affirming the decision of the district court and
following the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in PHH Corp., 163 the Ninth
Circuit held that the CFPB’s structure was constitutional. In response to
the firm’s petition for certiorari, the CFPB reversed the legal stance it had
taken in the Ninth Circuit and its Director announced that the CFPB has
“determined that the for-cause removal provision of the Consumer
Financial Protection Act of 2010 . . . is unconstitutional.” 164

156. Id. at 784 (quoting PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 198 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)).
157. CFPB v. All Am. Check Cashing, No. 3:16-cv-356-WHB-JCG, 2018 WL 9812125,

slip op. at *1–4 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 21, 2018).
158. Id. at *1; see Alan S. Kaplinsky, Fifth Circuit Hears Oral Argument in All American
Check Cashing, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/fifthcircuit-hears-oral-argument-all-american-check-cashing [https://perma.cc/N5JK-7G2Y].
159. Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019).
160. Id. at 587–89.
161. Id.
162. CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 923 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 427
(2019). The Court also directed the parties to brief and argue the question of: “If the [CFPB]
is found unconstitutional on the basis of the separation of powers, can 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3)
be severed from the Dodd-Frank Act?” 140 S. Ct. 427.
163. Seila Law, 923 F.3d at 682 (“We see no need to re-plow the same ground here.”).
164. Letter from Kathleen L. Kraninger, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to Nancy
Pelosi,
Speaker,
House
of
Representatives
(Sept.
17,
2019),
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2019/09/Pelosiletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7DC-AES4].

2020]

DISMANTLING DODD-FRANK

33

In questioning the constitutionality of her own agency, Director
Kraninger said that she believes that a decision that the structure of the
CFPB is unconstitutional “should not affect our ability to carry out the
Bureau’s important mission.” 165 However, the ability to sever the
structure of the agency from its actions is by no means a certain result. 166
In reaching this view, Kraninger seems to be relying on the reasoning in
the Kavanaugh dissent in PHH Corp. v. CFPB. Applying the two-part
test in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, 167 then-Judge Kavanaugh determined that severability of the “for
cause protections” of the CFPB Director would be the appropriate
remedy. 168 However, Judge Henderson, in a separate dissenting opinion,
argued: “In my view, the Congress would not have enacted Title X in its
current form absent for-cause removal protection. I believe, therefore,
that the appropriate remedy for the CFPB’s Article II problem is to
invalidate Title X in its entirety.” 169 In addition, entities regulated by the
CFPB are arguing that “[t]he logical conclusion is, if the power vested
in the Director is unconstitutional, then anything that stems from those
powers is null and void because that power is unchecked.” 170 In taking
up the case, the Supreme Court has specifically directed the parties to
address the question of severability.
Even if the CFPB had not changed its position on
constitutionality, it likely would not have had the opportunity to defend
the constitutionality of its structure before the Court. Although the CFPB
has independent litigating authority, 171 section 1054(e) of the DoddFrank Act provides:
165. Kathleen L. Krainger, Director Kraninger’s Speech at the National Consumer
Empowerment
Conference,
CFPB:
NEWSROOM
(Sept.
18,
2019),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/director-kraningers-speech-nationalconsumer-empowerment-conference/ [https://perma.cc/KW2H-GX4M].
166. Evan Weinberger, CFPB May Not Get Supreme Court Closure It Wants, BLOOMBERG
LAW (Oct. 4, 2019, 2:11 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/cfpb-may-notget-supreme-court-closure-it-wants [https://perma.cc/3VQ4-6FEB].
167. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
168. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 199 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Severability is
appropriate . . . so long as (i) Congress would have preferred the law with the offending
provision severed over no law at all; and (ii) the law with the offending provision severed
would remain ‘fully operative as a law.’” (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509)).
169. Id. at 160 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
170. Kate Berry, Kraninger’s Stance on CFPB Constitutionality Puts Rules in Limbo, AM.
BANKER (Oct. 1, 2019, 12:07 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/kraningersstance-on-cfpb-constitutionality-puts-rules-in-limbo [https://perma.cc/TX53-V7HN].
171. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1054(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5564(b) (2018).
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The Bureau may represent itself in its own name before
the Supreme Court of the United States, provided that the
Bureau makes a written request to the Attorney General
within the 10-day period which begins on the date of
entry of the judgment which would permit any party to
file a petition for writ of certiorari, and the Attorney
General concurs with such request or fails to take action
within 60 days of the request of the Bureau. 172
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) already had made its position
on the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure very clear. In its brief
opposing certiorari in State National Bank of Big Spring, the DOJ argued
that restrictions on removal of the CFPB Director “impermissibly
infringes on the President’s control of the Executive Branch, and
unconstitutionally frustrates the President’s ‘responsibility to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed.’” 173 But the DOJ went on to say that,
while the question was important, the State National Bank of Big Spring
case “would be a poor vehicle for considering the constitutionality of the
Bureau’s structure.” 174 In particular, the DOJ pointed to the fact that
Justice Kavanaugh’s participation in the decision at the Court of Appeals
likely would preclude his participation in the Supreme Court’s
subsequent consideration of the case. However, the DOJ, referencing
their position in State National Bank of Big Spring, argued that Seila Law
“presents a suitable vehicle for the Court’s review of the question.” 175
With the CFPB abandoning its position that its structure was
constitutional and joining the DOJ in opposition, the Court appointed an
amicus to argue the case in support of the lower court’s judgment. 176

172. Id. § 1054(e), 12 U.S.C. § 5564(e).
173. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 10, State Nat’l Bank

of Big Spring v. Mnuchin, 795 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 18-307) (quoting Free Enter.
Fund, 561 U.S. at 493), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 916 (2019).
174. Id.
175. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, CFPB
v. Seila Law LLC, No. 19-7 (Sept. 2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/197/116040/20190917144324154_19-7%20Seila%20Law.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AWW2LLSW].
176. Jordan S. Rubin, Clement ‘Unusual,’ ‘Excellent’ Friend for Wall Street Watchdog,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 25, 2019, 4:50 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/clement-unusual-excellent-friend-for-wall-street-watchdog [https://perma.cc/QX3BJNW2].
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4. Recess Appointments: National Labor Relations Board v. Noel
Canning
Although the court in State National Bank of Big Spring did not
consider the question of the validity of CFPB Director Cordray’s recess
appointment, that issue effectively would be addressed in National Labor
Relations Board v. Noel Canning. 177 In that case, the Supreme Court
determined that President Obama’s recess appointment of three members
of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) violated the
requirements of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution that
requires the President to obtain the “advice and consent” of the Senate
when appointing an officer of the United States. 178 The Court held that
“[a] Senate recess that is so short that it does not require the consent of
the House is not long enough to trigger the President’s recessappointment power.” 179 Therefore, because Director Cordray’s recess
appointment was made on the same day as the NLRB appointees, the
Court’s decision would have applied to the constitutionality of his recess
appointment had he not been subsequently re-nominated and confirmed.
5. Administrative Law Judges: Lucia v. SEC
The appointment power of agency heads is not the only issue
regarding appointments of government officials that has been raised by
opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act. Prior to passage of the Act, the SEC
could bring certain types of enforcement actions before its own ALJs but
could only impose monetary penalties if the subject of the action was a
regulated entity or a person associated with a regulated entity. Section
929P of the Dodd-Frank Act expanded this authority to impose monetary
penalties to include any person who violates the federal securities laws.180
In Lucia v. SEC, 181 the SEC brought an enforcement action
against an individual charging that he acted to deceive potential investors.
In a proceeding before an SEC ALJ, Lucia was fined and banned from
the industry. Lucia challenged the validity of the proceeding, arguing

177.
178.
179.
180.

Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014).
Id. at 518–19, 528–38; accord U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 537.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
929P(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77h–1(g)(1) (2018).
181. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
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that the ALJ had not been properly appointed under the Appointments
Clause. 182
The Appointments Clause states that “Congress may by Law vest
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” 183
The key question for decision was whether the SEC ALJs were “officers”
requiring appointment by the Commission or employees who could be
appointed by other staff within the SEC. In deciding the question, the
majority looked to Freytag v. Commissioner 184 to determine the status of
SEC ALJs. The Court found that ALJs held a continuing office
established by law, that they exercise significant discretion in carrying
out their adjudicative functions, 185 and that they have the ability to issue
decisions at the close of proceedings. 186 Having met all of the elements
present in Freytag, the Court held that the Commission’s ALJs were
“Officers of the United States” 187 and had been unconstitutionally
appointed because the Commission had left the appointment of ALJs to
SEC staff members. 188
The decision in Lucia completely changed the hiring process for
the approximately 1900 ALJ positions across the government. 189
President Trump issued Executive Order 13843 190 placing all ALJs in the
excepted service and abolished the competitive hiring system under the
Office of Personnel Management. “Lucia and Executive Order 13843
have made it necessary for agencies to construct new practices for [ALJ]
hiring.” 191
182. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
183. Id.
184. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (applying the “significant authority” test to

adjudicative officials—specifically, to special trial judges of the U.S. Tax Court).
185. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053. As in Freytag, the SEC ALJs had the power to take
testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, as well as the power to enforce
compliance with discovery orders. See id.
186. Id. The Court noted that the SEC ALJ decisions had greater independent effect, as
their decisions become final if the Commission declines review. See id. at 2053–54.
187. Id. at 2055.
188. Id. The Court’s remedy was to provide a rehearing with a different ALJ. See id.
189. JACK M. BEERMANN & JENNIFER L. MASCOTT, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
RESEARCH REPORT ON FEDERAL AGENCY ALJ HIRING AFTER LUCIA AND EXECUTIVE ORDER
13843,
at
3–6
(May
29,
2019),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Submitted%20final%20draft%20JB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZAC8-AFTV] (“Agencies have now commenced working on altering their
ALJ hiring procedures to conform to both the Lucia decision and the executive order.”).
190. Exec. Order No. 13843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32755 (July 13, 2018).
191. BEERMANN & MASCOTT, supra note 189, at 26.
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6. First Amendment: National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC
Beyond issues of the Appointments Clause, recess appointments,
and the executive powers of the President, the breadth of the Dodd-Frank
Act has even resulted in constitutional challenges on First Amendment
grounds. Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act 192 required the SEC to
issue regulations requiring firms using “conflict minerals” 193 to report
publicly whether they originated in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (“DRC”) or an adjoining country, and include “a description of
the products manufactured or contracted to be manufactured that are not
DRC conflict free.” 194 In National Association of Manufacturers v.
SEC, 195 a panel of the D.C. Circuit held that certain specific reporting
requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act and the rules promulgated under
them violated the First Amendment because it unconstitutionally
compelled speech. 196 The court held:
At all events, it is far from clear that the
description at issue—whether a product is “conflict
free”—is factual and non-ideological. Products and
minerals do not fight conflicts. The label “conflict free”
is a metaphor that conveys moral responsibility for the
Congo war. It requires an issuer to tell consumers that its
products are ethically tainted, even if they only indirectly
finance armed groups. An issuer, including an issuer who
condemns the atrocities of the Congo war in the strongest
terms, may disagree with that assessment of its moral
responsibility. 197
The court ruled that the statute and rule implementing section 1502 were
unconstitutional only to the extent that they required regulated entities to

192. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 1502(e)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 2218 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m note).
193. Under section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, “[t]he term ‘conflict mineral’ means[:]
(A) columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, gold, wolframite, or their derivatives; or (B) any
other mineral or its derivatives determined by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.” Id.
194. Id. § 1502(p)(1)(A)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii) (2018).
195. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
196. Id. at 533.
197. Id. at 554.
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report to the Commission and to state on their website that any of their
products have “not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free.’” 198
It also is worth noting that the D.C. Circuit was compelled to
review the cost-benefit analysis performed by the SEC in support of the
rule, and it did “not see any problems with the Commission’s cost-side
analysis.” 199 In what surely must have been a relief to the SEC, the court
went on to say, “we find it difficult to see what the Commission could
have done better.” 200
Shortly after the case was remanded back to the SEC, Acting
Chairman Piwowar announced that he had directed staff to reconsider
how companies should comply with the law and to solicit comments from
the public on whether SEC staff should update its guidance on
compliance. 201 Subsequently, Piwowar announced that the SEC was
suspending enforcement of the rule. 202 In a reversal of roles, supporters
of the Dodd-Frank Act in the person of Commissioner Stein criticized the
action stating that “[i]t is unprecedented for one commissioner, acting
alone and without official notice and comment, to engage in de facto
rulemaking.” 203
C.

Other Significant Litigation

1. FSOC Designations of Non-Bank Systemically Important Financial
Institutions
In MetLife v. Financial Stability Oversight Council, 204 MetLife—
a non-bank financial institution—challenged its designation by FSOC as
a non-bank SIFI. Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act 205 empowers FSOC
Id. at 556.
Id. at 552.
Id.
Sarah N. Lynch, Acting SEC Chair Seeks to Scale Back ‘Conflict Minerals’ Rule,
REUTERS (Jan. 31, 2017, 7:25 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-secconflictminerals/acting-sec-chair-seeks-to-scale-back-conflict-minerals-ruleidUSKBN15G2ZF [https://perma.cc/T7EK-CD9B].
202. Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Halts Some Enforcement of Conflict Minerals Rule Amid
Review, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2017, 3:23 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-secconflictminerals/sec-halts-some-enforcement-of-conflict-minerals-rule-amid-reviewidUSKBN1792WX [https://perma.cc/Z367-VXTJ].
203. Id.
204. MetLife, Inc. v. FSOC, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016).
205. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (2018).
198.
199.
200.
201.
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to determine that a nonbank financial company “shall be supervised by
the Federal Reserve and shall be subject to prudential standards.” 206 In
making the determination, FSOC is required to consider ten statutorily
enumerated factors and “any other risk-related factors that the Council
deems appropriate.” 207 FSOC subsequently issued guidance on its
designation of SIFIs. 208 On December 18, 2014, FSOC voted to
designate MetLife as a SIFI and MetLife sued to challenge the
designation.
Although section 113 limited judicial review to “whether the final
determination . . . was arbitrary and capricious,” 209 the district court in
MetLife rescinded the designation on two grounds. First, the court found
that “FSOC made critical departures from two of the standards it adopted
in its Guidance, never explaining such departures or even recognizing
them as such.” 210 By failing to assess MetLife’s vulnerability to material
financial distress and failing to determine that MetLife’s material
financial distress would materially impact MetLife counterparties, the
court determined that FSOC’s designation was arbitrary and
capricious. 211
In addition, the court found the designation to be arbitrary and
capricious because FSOC did not consider the cost of regulation. 212
Although there was no requirement in the Dodd-Frank Act requiring an
analysis of costs, the court held that the “decision intentionally refused to
consider the cost of regulation, a consideration that is essential to
reasoned rulemaking.” 213 The court also determined that FSOC was
required to consider the costs of regulation in its designation by the
statutory language that it “consider any other risk-related factors that [it]
deems appropriate.” 214 Thus, presumably any designation would require
206. Id.
207. Id. § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2).
208. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial

Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 21637 (Apr. 11, 2012) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310).
209. Dodd-Frank § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(h).
210. MetLife, Inc. v. FSOC, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 230 (2016).
211. Id. at 239 (“Having announced two key interpretations, FSOC was required either to
maintain them or to explain its deviation from them. It did neither. FSOC’s reversal on either
of these interpretations is enough to rescind the Final Determination as arbitrary and
capricious.”).
212. Id.
213. Dodd-Frank § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2)(k); MetLife, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 241 (citing
12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2)(k) as “the textual hook” requiring FSOC to perform a cost-benefit
analysis).
214. MetLife, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 240–41.
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a finding that the costs of regulation integral to the designation must be
outweighed by the congressionally determined, but not quantified,
benefit of a safer financial system.
The Obama Administration appealed the district court’s MetLife
decision, but the Trump Administration settled the case 215 and the parties
withdrew the appeal. 216 The drafters of the Dodd-Frank Act were deeply
concerned by a decision that went straight to the heart of one of the key
provisions of the Act designed to address future problems before they
became systemic. Former House Financial Services Committee
Chairman, Barney Frank, stated that he “was surprised that the district
court judge substituted her judgment for the FSOC’s on a specific issue
that is solely within its jurisdiction and competence.” 217 He went on to
say he “was shocked that the judge went on to substitute her judgment for
that of the entire Congress, by effectively amending the statute.” 218
Three years into the Trump Administration, none of the non-bank
entities originally designated as SIFIs by FSOC retain their
designations. 219 While MetLife avoided designation through litigation,
GE Capital and AIG altered their business structures to reduce their
potential systemic impact. Prudential was de-designated by a vote of
FSOC, now composed of Trump Administration regulators, following “a
detailed analysis showing that there is not a significant risk that the
company could pose a threat to financial stability.” 220 Whether because
of the litigation or a change its philosophical approach, FSOC announced
215. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Secretary Mnuchin Statement on the
MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council Appeal (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://home.treasury.gov/index.php/news/press-releases/sm0254 [https://perma.cc/HBP5WN6A] (“I am pleased that the Justice Department has settled the MetLife case, consistent
with the recommendation by a majority of FSOC voting members. Treasury has
recommended specific reforms to make the designation process more analytically rigorous,
clear, and transparent.”).
216. Pete Schroeder, MetLife, U.S. Regulators Agree to Set Aside Legal Fight, REUTERS
(Jan. 18, 2018, 8:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-metlife-fsoc/metlife-u-sregulators-agree-to-set-aside-legal-fight-idUSKBN1F8064 [https://perma.cc/VC6G-24LK].
217. Arthur D. Postal, Dodd-Frank Drafters Rip MetLife Ruling, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY
CTR. (June 23, 2016), https://www.theusconstitution.org/news/dodd-frank-drafters-ripmetlife-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/XH99-X2FS].
218. Id.
219. John Heltman, Prudential, the Last Nonbank SIFI, Sheds the Label, AM. BANKER
(Oct. 17, 2018, 9:08 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/prudential-the-lastnonbank-sifi-sheds-the-label [https://perma.cc/J9BP-334Y] (noting that the original
designations included MetLife, GE Capital, AIG, and Prudential).
220. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Financial Stability Oversight Council
Announces Rescission of Nonbank Financial Company Designation (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm525 [https://perma.cc/8R8B-E6QS].
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its intention to move away from an entity-based approach in designating
individual firms as SIFIs to “an activities-based approach to identifying
and addressing potential risks to financial stability.” 221 It is unclear how
effective this new approach to this key element of the Dodd-Frank Act
will be in identifying and placing regulatory restraints on nonbank
financial institutions that contribute to systemic risk.
2. Statutory Interpretation: Risk-Retention Requirement for CLO
Managers
Litigation also has defined the parameters of the statutory
language in parts of the Dodd-Frank Act and the willingness of courts to
interpret the statutory language broadly. In Loan Syndications & Trading
Association v. SEC, 222 the court considered the application of the Act’s
risk retention requirements 223 to managers of open-market collateralized
loan obligations (“CLO”), a type of asset-backed security. 224 Section 941
of the Act directs the SEC, Federal Reserve, FDIC and OCC to jointly
promulgate “regulations to require any securitizer to retain an economic
interest in a portion of the credit risk for any asset that the securitizer,
through the issuance of an asset-backed security, transfers, sells, or
conveys to a third party,” 225 specifically requiring that the securitizer
retain “not less than 5% of the credit risk of any asset.” 226 The SEC and
Fed subsequently issued a regulation applying this requirement to
managers of CLOs. 227 The CLO managers argued that the language of
the statute did not reach to their activities.
The D.C. Circuit held that the activities of the CLO managers did
not come under the definition of securitizer under the statute, stating that
“[t]he agencies’ interpretation seems to stretch the statute beyond the
natural meaning of what Congress wrote.” 228 In rejecting the agencies’
221. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Financial Stability Oversight Council
Proposes Changes to Nonbank Designations Guidance (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm621 [https://perma.cc/NL55-7JTM].
222. Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. SEC, 882 F.3d 220 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
223. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (2018); see id. § 941(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(79) (2018) (defining
“asset-backed security”).
224. Id. § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(b)(1).
225. Id. § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(b)(2).
226. Id. § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)(i).
227. 12 C.F.R. § 244.9 (2019) (Fed); 17 C.F.R. § 246.9 (2019) (SEC).
228. Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. SEC, 882 F.3d 220, 223 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

42

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 24

arguments for an expansive reading of the statute that would encompass
CLO managers, the court said that it would
sweep in brokers, lawyers, and non-CLO investment
managers who, though they play a part in organizing
securities and “causing” the transfer of securitized assets,
are clearly not the initiators of securitizations that
Congress intended to regulate. That the agencies’
interpretation sweeps so far beyond any reasonable
estimate of the congressional purpose confirms our view
that the interpretation is beyond the statutory language. 229
Although the court acknowledged that statutory language might
not reach all of the types of transactions that the regulators desired to
cover or Congress intended, it stated that if the language resulted in a
loophole, “it is one that the statute itself creates, and not one that the
agencies may close with an unreasonable distortion of the text’s ordinary
meaning.” 230 With this decision, the court signaled its intent to carefully
circumscribe the agencies’ interpretations of the extensive grants of
regulatory authority in the Dodd-Frank Act within the limits of the
statute’s language. 231
3. Statutorily-Mandated Reporting: Payments for Extractive Minerals
The set of cases surrounding provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
regarding reporting of payments for extractive minerals may be
illustrative of the future course of litigation under the Act involving
dueling lawsuits and competing legislative mandates. Unlike most
statutorily required reporting to the SEC which is intended for the benefit
of investors, section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, 232 like the reporting
requirements of section 1502 233 described above, 234 was designed to
229. Id. at 224–25.
230. Id. at 226.
231. For a more fulsome discussion of this case, see Elliot Ganz & Phillip Black, CLO

Risk Retention: A Case Study in Regulatory Indiscretion, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. Parts II–III
(2020).
232. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 1504, 124 Stat. 1376, 2220–22 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78m(q)(2)(A)).
233. Id. § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–18 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m note).
234. See discussion supra Part III.B.6.
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serve a social goal of improving transparency of payments to
governments regarding resource extraction. Specifically, section 1504
provided:
Not later than 270 days after July 21, 2010, the
Commission shall issue final rules that require each
resource extraction issuer to include in an annual report
of the resource extraction issuer information relating to
any payment made by the resource extraction issuer, a
subsidiary of the resource extraction issuer, or an entity
under the control of the resource extraction issuer to a
foreign government or the Federal Government for the
purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural
gas, or minerals. 235
Section 1504 also provided that, “[t]o the extent practicable, the
Commission shall make available online, to the public, a compilation of
the information required to be submitted.” 236
For a number of reasons, including the difficulty of completing
an economic analysis on the new congressional mandate, the Commission
did not meet the required deadline. In May 2012, Oxfam America, a
“global organization working to end the injustice of poverty” 237 and a
supporter of the provision, filed suit against the SEC to compel it to move
forward with the implementing regulation, arguing that it was unlawfully
delaying the issuance of the rule. 238 Subsequently, the SEC issued a final
rule in August 2012. 239 Following the release of the final rule, Oxfam
America dropped its suit.
The new rule’s opponents then filed suit challenging the
regulation. In American Petroleum Institute v. SEC, 240 the district court
vacated the rule and remanded it back to the SEC. Although the
opponents raised both First Amendment and cost-benefit issues, the court
235. Dodd-Frank § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A).
236. Id. § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(3)(A).
237. About
Oxfam,
OXFAM
AM.,
https://www.oxfamamerica.org/about/

[https://perma.cc/7SNB-HUSN] (last visited Feb. 13, 2019).
238. Oxfam America Files Lawsuit Against Securities and Exchange Commission, OXFAM
AM.: PRESS RELEASES (May 16, 2012), https://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/oxfam-americafiles-lawsuit-against-securities-and-exchange-commission/ [https://perma.cc/6C2K-M9BB].
239. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 56365 (Sept.
12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249).
240. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2013).
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instead ruled on narrower grounds, stating that “the Commission misread
the statute to mandate public disclosure of the reports, and its decision to
deny any exemption [for countries that prohibit payment disclosure] was,
given the limited explanation provided, arbitrary and capricious.” 241
When the SEC did not issue a revised final rule by September
2014, Oxfam America sued the SEC again claiming that it was unlawfully
withholding a final rule implementing section 1504. 242 In Oxfam
America, Inc. v. SEC, 243 the district court held that the SEC’s failure to
promulgate a final disclosure rule constituted agency action unlawfully
withheld under the APA. 244 The SEC argued that it had promulgated a
final rule and had not unlawfully withheld action, but the rule had been
vacated by the D.C. District Court. 245 The court rejected the SEC’s
argument and held that the remand simply restored the status quo and
“that the SEC’s delay in promulgating the final extraction payments
disclosure rule can be considered ‘unlawfully withheld’ as the duty to
promulgate a final extraction payments disclosure rule remains
unfulfilled more than four years past Congress’s deadline.” 246 The court
ordered the SEC to file an expedited schedule for filing the rule. 247
After having lost separate litigation battles to both opponents and
supporters of the rule, the SEC issued its new final rule in June 2016. 248
Reporting under the new rule became effective in September 2016, but
reporting was not required until 2019. 249 However, before the rule’s
reporting requirements became mandatory, Congress invalidated the rule
in early 2017 under the Congressional Review Act. 250 These specific
provisions of the Congressional Review Act are discussed in more detail
in Part IV of this Article. 251

241. Id. at 11.
242. See Oxfam America Sues SEC Over Delay on Oil, Gas and Mining Transparency

AM.:
PRESS
RELEASES
(Sept.
18,
2014),
Rules,
OXFAM
https://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/oxfam-america-sues-sec-over-delay-on-oil-gas-andmining-transparency-rules/ [https://perma.cc/2EBJ-HENQ].
243. Oxfam Am., Inc. v. SEC, 126 F. Supp. 3d 168 (D. Mass. 2015).
244. Id. at 172.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 176.
248. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed. Reg. 49360 (July 27,
2016) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b).
249. Id.
250. Congressional Review Act (“CRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 868 (1996).
251. See discussion infra Part IV.F.
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The legal battle around section 1504 illustrates the potential
future of litigation surrounding the Dodd-Frank Act. While opponents of
the Act were far more vigorous in the courts in the early days of
implementation, supporters of the Act have adopted several of the same
legal strategies to challenge the deregulatory administrative actions of the
Trump Administration. For example, in an echo of prior legal arguments,
seven state attorneys general have sued to block the SEC’s recent
rulemaking on Regulation Best Interest, 252 claiming that the agency failed
to follow the Dodd-Frank Act’s statutory mandate and that it was based
on a flawed economic analysis. 253 A decade into implementation, the
Dodd-Frank Act continues to provide grist for the legal mill.
IV. LEGISLATION AND EXECUTIVE ACTION
The most important factor determining whether legislative
activity around the Dodd-Frank Act for the past decade was successful
has been divided government. Except for a brief two-year period (2017–
2018), neither political party has controlled the House, Senate, and
Presidency. In addition, neither party during that time has held more than
sixty seats in the Senate—the threshold necessary to invoke cloture and
close off debate in the Senate. 254 As a result, this has meant that
opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act only have been able to make changes
to the law if they can convince supporters of the law to join them, or by
pursuing legislative strategies that involve the limited exceptions that
avoid the cloture requirements in the Senate.
While some of the legislative efforts to amend the Dodd-Frank
Act described in this Part were unsuccessful, they provide important
insight into the policy goals of the opponents of the Act. In addition,
252. Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg.
33318 (July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
253. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, New York v. SEC, No. 1:19-cv08365 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); see also Dave Michaels, Seven States Sue SEC on Concern Broker
Rule Is Weak, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2019, 11:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sevenstates-sue-sec-on-concern-broker-rule-is-weak-11568085859
[https://perma.cc/UNZ3MVP3].
254. CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-425, INVOKING CLOTURE IN THE
SENATE
1
(2017),
https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/be873e40-a966-4feb-9d72cf23a93cbe46.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ4C-WC39] (“Cloture is the only procedure by which
the Senate can vote to set an end to a debate without also rejecting the bill, amendment,
conference report, motion, or other matter it has been debating. . . . The majority required to
invoke cloture for most business is three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn, or 60
votes if there are no vacancies in the Senate’s membership.”).
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these unsuccessful efforts built a legislative foundation and contributed
provisions to the limited number of legislative changes that ultimately
passed. It is, therefore, useful to consider these bills to provide context
for the legislative changes to the Act that were ultimately enacted into
law.
A.

The Financial CHOICE Act

The Financial CHOICE 255 Act (“CHOICE Act”) 256 was first
introduced in the 114th Congress by Representative Jeb Hensarling (RTX), the Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee.
Although the bill passed the Committee on a partisan vote of thirty to
twenty-six, the full House of Representatives never considered the bill.
An amended version of the bill was introduced as H.R. 10 in the 115th
Congress. 257
The CHOICE Act’s supporters argued that, if adopted, the more
than 600-page bill
replaces onerous government fiat with market discipline;
substitutes bankruptcy for taxpayer-funded bailouts;
throws a deregulatory life preserver to our community
financial institutions; replaces complexity with
simplicity; holds both Washington and Wall Street
accountable; and unleashes capital formation so the
economy can move yet again for the betterment of our
citizens. 258
In furtherance of this expressed goal, the CHOICE Act would
have repealed or amended almost every section of the Dodd-Frank Act
255. The acronym “CHOICE” stands for “Crea[ting] Hope and Opportunity for Investors,
Consumers, and Entrepreneurs.” See H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017) (“[An Act t]o create hope
and opportunity for investors, consumers, and entrepreneurs by ending bailouts and Too Big
to fail, holding Washington and Wall Street accountable, eliminating red tape to increase
access to capital and credit, and repealing the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that make
America less prosperous, less stable, and less free, and for other purposes.”).
256. H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. (2016).
257. H.R. 10. The biggest change between the original version of the CHOICE Act and
H.R. 10 was the removal of a provision that would have deleted the Durbin amendment to the
Dodd-Frank Act (section 1075) that limits transaction fees imposed on merchants by debit
card issuers. This provision was highly contentious, and the provision was removed to attract
additional Republican votes for the bill.
258. H.R REP. NO. 115-153, pt. 1, bk. 1, at 153 (2017) (accompanying H.R. 10).
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had it been enacted into law. Major sections of the Dodd-Frank Act that
would have been affected include:

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

•

Repeal of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act which
establishes orderly liquidation authority for the FDIC
to resolve failing nonbank financial institutions. The
CHOICE Act also would have removed the FDIC
from the review of “living wills,” 259 and created a
new section in Chapter 11 of the U. S. Bankruptcy
Code with procedures for “liquidating, reorganizing
or recapitalizing covered financial corporations.” 260

•

Repeal the powers of FSOC to designate nonbank
financial institutions as SIFIs. It also would have
canceled any existing designations, as well as
repealed the Federal Reserve’s authority to supervise
and set regulations for nonbank financial
institutions. 261

•

Exempt banks from risk-weighted capital ratios,
liquidity
requirements,
enhanced
prudential
regulation (if the bank has more than $50 billion in
assets), and other regulations if the bank opts to be
subject to a 10% leverage ratio. 262

•

Require financial regulatory agencies to include costbenefit analyses with all rulemakings and prohibit
them from issuing a notice of final rulemaking if costs
are greater than benefits without a joint resolution
from Congress directing the agency to issue a notice
of final rulemaking. 263 It also would have required
that Congress approve rules having an annual effect
on the economy of $100 million or more. 264

H.R. 10 § 111.
Id. § 122.
Id. § 151.
Id. §§ 601, 602.
Id. § 312.
Id. § 331.
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Place federal financial regulators under the
congressional appropriations process. 265
Replace the CFPB with the Consumer Law
Enforcement Agency and change that agency’s
powers, leadership, mandate, and funding. 266 It also
would have removed the agency’s examination and
supervisory powers and made the Director removable
at-will by the President. 267

•

Repeal the Volcker Rule limitations on bank
proprietary trading. 268

•

Require an annual audit of the Federal Reserve and
limit its emergency lending powers. 269

The bill also contained dozens of additional changes targeted at specific
issues of concern to opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act.
The CHOICE Act passed the House on June 8, 2017, with no
Democrats voting in favor of the bill. Without a sixty-vote margin in the
Senate, and with strong opposition to the bill by the Democrats in the
Senate, there was never any real prospect that the Senate would take it
up.
Turning to a different strategy, Chairman Hensarling began
breaking off pieces of some of the less controversial provisions of the
CHOICE Act in an attempt to garner support from some Democrats,
offering them as individual bills in the Financial Services Committee and
the House. Focusing on provisions to benefit small banks and credit
unions, and ostensibly to assist borrowers and investors, Hensarling was
able to gain at least some Democratic support for many of the bills. For
example, in October 2017, the Financial Services Committee passed
twenty-two bills—many by a bipartisan majority—including several that
originated as provisions in the CHOICE Act. 270 In January 2018, the
Id. §§ 361–65.
Id. §§ 711–37.
Id.
Id. § 901.
Id. §§ 1008, 1010.
Press Release from Republicans on the U.S. House of Representatives Fin. Servs.
Comm., Committee Advances 22 Bills Forward for House Consideration (Oct. 12, 2017),
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
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Committee passed fifteen individual bills, several with bipartisan
support, and many of which were derived from provisions in the CHOICE
Act or included provisions under consideration in financial reform
legislation that was concurrently being negotiated in the Senate. 271
While continuing to push the CHOICE Act would have achieved
very little legislatively, focusing on individual issues that had the
potential to generate bipartisan support allowed Hensarling to show that
the opponents of Dodd-Frank were willing to negotiate and accept less
than their ultimate legislative desires. It also was an attempt to keep the
House relevant in the deregulatory debate that was progressing in the
Senate.
B.

S. 2155 – The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and
Consumer Protection Act of 2018

S. 2155, 272 the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and
Consumer Protection Act (“EGRRCPA”), 273 which made the most
significant legislative changes to the Dodd-Frank Act since its enactment,
grew out of bipartisan negotiations in the Senate Banking Committee and
the election year needs of several Democratic Senators. Whether because
of a desire to demonstrate that they could legislate in a bipartisan fashion
or a need to demonstrate flexibility to potential campaign donors, several
Senators who were up for reelection, many in states that had been carried
in the 2016 election by President Trump, were primed to engage in
discussions to amend the Dodd-Frank Act. However, their intention was
to keep the effort limited to popular provisions intended to assist
community banks and local communities. Initially four Democratic
members of the Senate Banking Committee engaged in discussions with
Chairman Crapo to identify areas of agreement. 274
https://republicans-financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=
402432 [https://perma.cc/6A86-2TS9].
271. Press Release from Republicans on the U.S. House of Representatives Fin. Servs.
Comm., Committee Advances 15 Bills (Jan. 18, 2018), https://republicansfinancialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=402932
[https://perma.cc/GC5P-LWUC].
272. S. 2155, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); accord Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief,
and Consumer Protection Act (“EGRRCPA”), Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018).
273. EGRRCPA, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296.
274. Amanda Terkel, Arthur Delaney & Zach Carter, Behind the Scenes of the Bruising
Bank Fight that Divided Senate Democrats, HUFFPOST (June 7, 2018, 2:41 PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/senate-democrats-bankingfight_n_5b188c89e4b09578259ed910 [https://perma.cc/WYK3-4S24].
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Following a few months of negotiations, the EGRRCPA was
introduced as S. 2155 on November 16, 2017, with nine Democratic
Senators and one Independent as cosponsors. 275 The bill quickly passed
the Senate Banking Committee a month later and passed the full Senate
on March 14, 2018, by a vote of sixty-seven in favor and thirty-one
against—far exceeding the sixty-vote threshold—with the concurrence of
seventeen Democrats and Independents. After a delay of several months
where Chairman Hensarling sought to add additional provisions from the
CHOICE Act and various House bills to the bill, S. 2155 passed the
House by a bipartisan vote of 258 to 159 and was signed into law by
President Trump on May 24, 2018. 276
Although the EGRRCPA, as enacted, was a far cry from the
extensive rollback of the Dodd-Frank Act that many of its opponents had
wanted, it nevertheless included several significant changes. Among
other things, the main provisions of EGRRCPA, as enacted, included the
following:
•

Increases the asset threshold for automatic
designations of banks as SIFIs to $250 billion from
the Dodd-Frank Act’s $50 billion threshold. This
amendment reduced by more than half the number of
banks with assets over $50 billion that would
automatically be designated as SIFIs. The Act also
sets a $250 billion asset threshold for all Federal
Reserve- and company-run tests, as well as permits
changes in the test scenarios and reduces the
frequency of self-conducted tests. 277

•

Exempts banks with $10 billion or less in assets from
the Volcker Rule. 278

•

Creates a community bank leverage ratio 279 for banks
with less than $10 billion to simplify their capital

275. Non-Republican original cosponsors included Senators Donnelly, Heitkamp, Tester,
Warner, McCaskill, Manchin, King, Kaine, Peters, and Bennet.
276. EGRRCPA, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296.
277. Id. § 401, 132 Stat. at 1356–59.
278. Id. § 203, 132 Stat. at 1309.
279. Id. § 201(a)(1), 132 Stat. at 1306 (“[T]he ratio of the tangible equity capital of a
qualifying community bank, as reported on the qualifying community bank’s applicable
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compliance. 280 The leverage ratio would be at least
8% and no more than 10%. 281
•

Relaxes the supplementary leverage ratio (“SLR”) 282
requirements established by the federal financial
regulators under the enhanced capital requirements of
the Dodd-Frank Act for banks that are
“predominantly engaged in custody, safekeeping, and
asset servicing activities.” 283 Custodian bank funds
that are deposited with the Fed or another central
bank would not be counted as assets for the SLR
calculation. 284

•

Revises the liquidity coverage ratio 285 rule that
requires banks with at least $250 billion in assets, or
$10 billion in on-balance-sheet foreign exposure, to
hold a certain amount of high-quality liquid assets
(“HQLA”) 286 that can be easily sold during a crisis to

regulatory filing with the qualifying community bank’s appropriate Federal banking
agency, to the average total consolidated assets of the qualifying community bank, as
reported on the qualifying community bank’s applicable regulatory filing with the
qualifying community bank’s appropriate Federal banking agency.”).
280. Id. § 201(c)(1)(A)–(B), 132 Stat. at 1307. A bank that exceeds the ratio would be
considered to have met: (1) generally applicable leverage and risk-based capital requirements
under federal banking rules; and (2) banking regulatory standards for well-capitalized
depository institutions. Id.
281. Id. § 201(b)(1), 132 Stat. at 1306.
282. Regulatory capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Enhanced Supplementary Leverage
Ratio Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and Their Subsidiary Insured
Depository Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. 24528, 24530 (May 1, 2014) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts.
6, 208, 217 & 324) (“[A] non-risk-based measure of tier 1 capital relative to an exposure
amount that includes both on- and off-balance sheet exposures.”).
283. EGRRCPA § 402(a), 132 Stat. at 1359.
284. Id. § 402(b)(2)(a), 132 Stat. at 1359–60.
285. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg.
61439, 61443 (Oct. 10, 2014) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329) (“The final rule
requires a covered company to maintain an amount of HQLA meeting the criteria set forth in
this final rule (the HQLA amount, which is the numerator of the ratio) that is no less than 100
percent of its total net cash outflows over a prospective 30 calendar-day period (the
denominator of the ratio).”).
286. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards, and Monitoring,
78 Fed. Reg. 71817, 71823 (Nov. 29, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329)
(“Assets that would qualify as HQLA should be easily and immediately convertible into cash
with little or no loss of value during a period of liquidity stress.”).
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include a municipal security that is liquid, readily
marketable, and investment-grade. 287
•

Increases an asset cap from $1 billion to $3 billion
under which well-capitalized and highly rated insured
banks can receive an on-site regulatory examination
every eighteen months instead of every twelve
months. 288

•

Allows banks with less than $5 billion in assets to
submit abbreviated required financial reports to
federal regulators every other quarter. However, full
reports would still be required for the remaining
quarters. 289

•

Allows a residential mortgage loan to qualify as a
qualified mortgage 290 if it is originated and held in
portfolio for the duration of the loan by an insured
depository institution or credit union that—together
with its affiliates—has less than $10 billion in
assets. 291

The EGRRCPA also included a number of additional provisions to reduce
the regulatory burden regarding community banks, residential mortgage
lending, and capital formation.
The passage of the EGRRCPA left many hard feelings between
Democrats who supported the bill and those who opposed it. The
presidential campaign of one of the bill’s strongest opponents, Senator
Elizabeth Warren, published the names of Democrats who voted for the
bill and said, “[w]e want everyone to know whose side their senators are
standing on this week: the big banks or the American people.” 292
Democratic Senators supporting the bill issued a seven point rebuttal of
287.
288.
289.
290.

EGRRCPA § 403, 132 Stat. at 1360.
Id. § 210, 132 Stat. at 1316.
Id. § 205, 132 Stat. at 1310.
Id. § 101, 132 Stat. at 1297–98; accord 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(2)(A) (2018) (defining
“qualified mortgage” as any residential mortgage where the consumer is presumed to have a
reasonable ability to repay the loan).
291. EGRRCPA § 101, 132 Stat. at 1297–98.
292. Terkel, Delaney & Carter, supra note 274.
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the “Fact versus Fiction” of the bill arguing that it was appropriately
targeted to benefit Main Street and not Wall Street. 293 The fact that a
number of the Senators who supported the EGRRCPA lost in the 2018
election 294—despite their participation in the bipartisan effort to pass the
bill—would not provide much encouragement for future bipartisan
support for additional legislation to amend the Dodd-Frank Act. 295
The EGRRCPA was clearly the most significant legislative
change to the Dodd-Frank Act. Its sponsors were able to seize a brief
window of time to pass a bill with limited reach that served the political
needs of both sides of the aisle. This differentiated it from prior
legislative deregulation efforts which followed much more partisan
legislative strategies with limited effect.
Although the law was passed with bipartisan support, its
implementation has been controversial. House Financial Services
Chairman Maxine Waters summed up the concerns of many supporters
of the Dodd-Frank Act in stating that she is
concerned that our banking regulators are following the
dangerous deregulatory blueprint that the Trump
Administration laid out in a series of Treasury reports,
and checking off deregulatory items one by one. For
example, they have moved to weaken capital, stress
testing, and other requirements for the largest financial
institutions; taken action to weaken the Volcker rule, a
rule which prevents banks from gambling with taxpayer
dollars; and proposed weakening the swap margin rule,
which would threaten our economic stability for a $40
billion giveaway to Wall Street megabanks. In rolling
293. Joint Statement from Senators Donnelly, Heitkamp, Tester & Warner, U.S. Senate
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, FACT versus FICTION: Bipartisan regulatory
relief helps Main Street and rural communities while staying tough on Wall Street,
https://www.banking.senate.gov/download/12-4-myth-fact-on-fin-reg-reform-billheitkamptester-donnelly-warnerdocx [https://perma.cc/B6KT-MZLQ].
294. Democratic Senators who supported the bill and lost the election included Donnelly,
Heitkamp, McCaskill, and Nelson. Republican Senator Heller also supported the bill and lost
his reelection bid.
295. Victoria Guida & Zachary Warmbrodt, Bank-Friendly Senate Democrats Fall in
Midterms, in Blow to Industry, POLITICO (Nov. 7, 2018, 10:11 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/07/banking-financial-services-committees-seeshakeup-in-blow-to-industry-2164813 [https://perma.cc/H2HW-H43W] (“After last night, it
would be hard for Dem senators to think that cooperating with Republicans on financial policy
is helpful to winning re-election.”).
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back important reforms put in place in the [Dodd-Frank
Act] to protect consumers, investors and the economy,
regulators are opening the door to bad practices that
contributed to the devastating financial crisis of 2008. 296
The Trump Administration has moved aggressively to implement the
EGRRCPA. In the eighteen months since its passage, the federal
financial regulators have issued final rules for twelve provisions of the
Act. 297 These regulations include changes to the rules regarding the
examination cycle, resolution plans, stress tests, capital ratios, and the
Volcker Rule.
Although Administration officials have contended that they are
implementing the Act in a manner intended to “ensure our regulatory
regime is not only simple, efficient, and transparent, but also coherent
and effective,” 298 supporters of the Dodd-Frank Act have questioned
whether they are using the EGRRCPA as license to greatly expand the
deregulatory impact of the enacted reforms. For example, in commenting
on the regulators’ proposed rule to amend the Volcker Rule, Paul Volcker
wrote that, “[t]he new rule amplifies risk in the financial system,
increases moral hazard and erodes protections against conflicts of interest
that were so glaringly on display during the last crisis.” 299 He went on to
note:
It bolsters the views of skeptics who believe that the
“simplification” effort was merely a ploy to weaken the
core elements of the reform. It also serves as a reminder
of the insidious nature of lobbying in regulation and
296. Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., Waters Urges Regulators to Hold
Depository
Institutions
Accountable
(Dec.
4,
2019),
https://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=404887
[https://perma.cc/AD88-AS76].
297. Oversight of Prudential Regulators: Ensuring the Safety, Soundness, Diversity, and
Accountability of Depository Institutions?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
116th Cong. (Dec. 4, 2019) (statement of Jelena McWilliams, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp.),
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba00-wstatemcwilliamsj-20191204.pdf [https://perma.cc/JMJ8-YAJE].
298. Statement Before the Comm. on Fin. Servs. on the Economic Growth, Regulatory
Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, 116th Cong. (Dec. 4, 2019) (statement of Randal K.
Quarles, Vice Chair for Supervision, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/files/quarles20191204a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TP3B-DNZH].
299. Letter from Paul Volcker to Chairman Jerome Powell (Aug. 20, 2019) (on file with
author).
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should trouble anyone concerned with the eroding public
trust in government and the role of the Federal Reserve as
the principle guardian of financial stability. 300
For their part, the Republican supporters of the EGRRCPA on the Senate
Banking Committee continued to urge federal financial agencies to move
forward rapidly with implementation, 301 partially to avoid delayed
rulemaking that would not be finalized within sixty legislative days of the
end to the Congress and thus potentially subject to the future application
of the Congressional Review Act depending on the outcome of the 2020
elections. 302
C.

Appropriations

Appropriations bills are one of the favored ways for Members of
Congress to attempt to pass legislation that they otherwise can not pass
through the normal legislative process. Congress must pass legislation
each year to fund government programs, thus providing annual
opportunities for making legislative changes. Although the Rules of the
House of Representatives 303 and of the Senate 304 generally prohibit
legislating on an appropriations bill, it is nevertheless a fairly common
practice. Like their legislative brethren, appropriations bills in the Senate
still must by rule meet a sixty-vote threshold to limit debate, 305 so their
utility as legislative vehicles is limited for controversial legislation.
Since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, opponents of the Act
have sought to use the appropriations process to alter its provisions with
limited success. Nevertheless, the appropriations process did result in
300. Id.
301. Letter from Republican Members of the U.S. Senate Banking Comm. to Jerome H.

Powell, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Joseph M. Otting, Comptroller,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Jelena McWilliams, Chairman, Fed. Deposit
Ins.
Corp.
(July
30,
2019),
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Powell%20Otting%20McWilliams%20Lett
er%207-30-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/7U5F-ZLXJ].
302. For a deeper discussion of the Congressional Review Act, see infra Part IV.F of this
Article.
303. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, R. XXI, cl. 2, at 35 (116th Cong., 2019),
https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/116-1/116-House-RulesClerk.pdf [https://perma.cc/XNF7-XWGL].
304. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, R. XVI, at 11–12 (2013),
https://www.rules.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3ZSN6DB] (GPO edition).
305. Id. at R. XXII, at 15–17.

56

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 24

one significant change to the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 716 of the Act, 306
known as the “swaps pushout rule,” prohibited federal assistance
(including access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window and deposit
insurance) to banks that engaged in certain swap activities. As a result,
banks were required to move such activities outside the bank to separately
capitalized nonbank affiliates. The provision had been controversial
since it was originally proposed during consideration of the Dodd-Frank
Act. 307
The large banks that were most affected by the swaps pushout
rule disliked the provision, arguing that it was costly and difficult to
implement. They had spent several years trying to amend or repeal the
Act. Working behind the scenes to change the language, the large banks
had enlisted some regional banks in the effort to amend the law. In 2013,
a bill to amend the swaps pushout rule 308 passed the House by a vote of
292 to 122, with seventy Democrats voting in support. The passage of
the bill was the subject of some controversy when it was revealed that
most of the bill was based on language that had been drafted by lobbyists
for the large banks. 309 The bill did not repeal the swaps pushout rule, but
permitted banks to retain certain types of swap activities within the bank,
requiring that far fewer activities be pushed out of the bank. Although
the bill had passed the House with the support of seventy Democrats, the
Senate did not take it up.
In 2014, similar language was added the Financial Services and
General Government Appropriations bill. 310 Late in that year, Congress
and the Obama Administration reached an agreement and passed
legislation that was signed into law to fund the government for the
coming fiscal year through a last-minute omnibus appropriations bill that
306. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
716, 15 U.S.C. § 8305 (2018).
307. Dave Clarke, Kate Davidson & John Prior, How Wall St. Got Its Way: Liberals Fight
Back, But can’t Stop, Bonanza for Banks., POLITICO (Dec. 11, 2014, 10:40 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/wall-street-spending-bill-congress-113525
[https://perma.cc/JB5D-YXNV].
308. Swaps Regulatory Improvement Act, H.R. 992, 113th Cong. (2013); see Dodd-Frank
§ 716, 15 U.S.C. § 8305.
309. Eric Lipton & Ben Protess, Banks’ Lobbyists Help in Drafting Financial Bills, N.Y.
TIMES (May 23, 2013, 9:44 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/banks-lobbyistshelp-in-drafting-financial-bills/
[https://perma.cc/X95C-K8TF]
(“Citigroup’s
recommendations were reflected in more than 70 lines of the House Committee’s 85-line
bill.”).
310. Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, H.R. 5016, 113th
Cong. (2014).
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included language to amend the swaps pushout rule. 311 The language
caused an uproar among the Dodd-Frank Act’s strongest supporters. 312
Not only were they concerned about the substance of the legislation, they
also were concerned that the precedent of attaching changes to the DoddFrank Act in must-pass funding bills would provide a roadmap to future
legislative changes. 313 However, the uproar surrounding the efforts to
change the Act through this process generated so much public attention
and negative publicity that the heightened vigilance of the Dodd-Frank
Act supporters in subsequent appropriations bills ensured that no other
significant changes to the Act would be made successfully through this
process going forward.
For example, the Fiscal Year 2018 (“FY18”) Financial Services
and General Government Appropriations bill, 314 as introduced, included
numerous provisions from the Financial CHOICE Act, including: (a)
repealing the FSOC’s ability to designate nonbank financial institutions
as SIFIs; 315 (b) altering the membership, proceedings and duties of the
FSOC; 316 (c) making all of the federal financial regulators subject to
appropriations; 317 (d) repealing the Volcker Rule; 318 (e) altering the living
will process; 319 (f) eliminating the CFPB’s authority to supervise and
examine financial institutions; 320 and (g) eliminating the enforcement
authority of the CFPB with regard to payday loans. 321 In addition, the
bill included a new Chapter 14 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code regarding
the failure of large complex financial institutions. 322 Yet, none of these
provisions survived the appropriations process, nor were they enacted
into law.

311. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128
Stat. 2130 (2014).
312. Lipton & Protess, supra note 309.
313. Id. (“This is a road map for stealth unwinding of financial reform.” (quoting
Representative Barney Frank)).
314. Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, H.R. 3280, 115th
Cong. (2017).
315. See id. § 903.
316. See id.
317. See id. §§ 904–08.
318. See id. § 933.
319. See id. § 903.
320. See id. § 927.
321. See id. § 928.
322. See id. § 1001.
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Budget Reconciliation

In 2017, with Republicans in control of the House, Senate, and
Presidency, but with a Senate majority still below the sixty-vote threshold
to cut off debate, opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act looked for legislative
actions that they could take with a simple majority vote in the Senate. A
process known as budget reconciliation provided just such an
opportunity.
Under the Congressional Budget Act, 323 the Congress annually
adopts a budget resolution setting out the budgetary goals for the coming
fiscal year. The budget resolution is not signed by the President and
therefore does not carry the force of law. To meet the budgetary goals,
Congress often must pass separate legislation “to reconcile existing law
with its current priorities.” 324 “Reconciliation” provides an expedited
procedure for considering legislation to bring existing spending and
revenue laws into compliance with the new budget. 325
Congress first adopts a budget resolution that includes
reconciliation instructions which instruct relevant authorizing
committees to develop and report legislation that will achieve the budget
goals of the budget resolution. 326 The relevant committees develop and
report legislation that meets their assigned targets of spending reductions
or revenue increases. The committees then report their legislative
recommendations to the Budget Committee which packages them into a
reconciliation bill for consideration by the House and Senate. 327 In the
Senate, reconciliation bills are privileged and it is generally “unnecessary
to invoke cloture in order to reach a final vote on a reconciliation bill in
the Senate.” 328 Thus, if legislation will reduce spending or increase
revenues through reconciliation, it is possible for a simple majority in
both the House and the Senate to move legislation to the President.
During times of unified government, this allows the majorities in the

323. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297
(1974).
324. MEGAN S. LYNCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44058, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION
PROCESS:
STAGES
OF
CONSIDERATION
1
(2017),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44058 [https://perma.cc/RV82-2BW8].
325. Id.
326. Id. at 2.
327. Id. at 5.
328. Id. at 8.
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House and Senate and the President to enact laws under expedited
procedures with no minority support.
Prior to passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the FDIC only had
authority to manage the failure of banks, but not their holding companies
or other nonbank entities. 329 Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act gave the
FDIC orderly liquidation authority (“OLA”) to manage the failures of
bank holding companies and other financial institutions that had been
designated as SIFIs. 330 The FDIC is empowered to borrow from the
Treasury to fund these resolutions 331 and to recapture any costs from
remaining bank holding companies and SIFIs at no cost to the
taxpayer. 332
Critics of OLA have argued that Title II effectively enshrines
“Too Big to Fail” by using government resources to manage the
resolution of these institutions rather than having them go through
bankruptcy as in the case of the failure of Lehman Brothers. 333
Supporters of OLA argue that the inability to manage the failures of large,
complex financial institutions actually results in “Too Big to Fail” as the
government has limited options for managing their failure other than
providing financial support. 334 Under OLA, if an institution fails, its
management is replaced, and its assets are liquidated. 335
329. Establishing a Framework for Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Sheila C. Bair,
Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.), republished in Speeches & Testimony, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP.
(July
23,
2009),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2009/spjuly2309.html
[https://perma.cc/925A-N2NA].
330. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
204, 12 U.S.C. § 5384(a) (2018).
331. Id. § 210, 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n) (2018).
332. Id. § 214, 12 U.S.C. § 5394 (2018).
333. REPUBLICAN STAFF OF THE H. FIN. SERVS. COMM., 113TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON
FAILING TO END “TOO BIG TO FAIL”: AN ASSESSMENT FOR THE DODD-FRANK ACT FOUR YEARS
LATER
1,
passim
(July
2014),
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ross_levine/Other/House_Republications_071814_tbtf_repo
rt_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/D67Y-RDXJ] (“[The report] concludes that not only did the
Dodd-Frank Act not end ‘too big to fail,’ it had the opposite effect of further entrenching it as
official government policy.”).
334. Erika Eichelberger, The House GOP’s Hypocrisy on “Too-Big-To-Fail”, MOTHER
JONES (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/11/house-republicanstoo-big-to-fail/ [https://perma.cc/AE4S-BMBD] (“The GOP-controlled House, meanwhile,
has passed legislation making it more likely that failing banks will get government handouts,
and attempted to defund measures that would help the government wind down failing
banks.”).
335. Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., A Progress Report on the
Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (May 12, 2015) (speaking to the
Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, D.C.), reprinted in Speeches &
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Although OLA is designed to recover any costs incurred in the
resolution of a large, complex financial institution from assessments on
the financial industry, 336 the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) has
“scored” OLA as increasing the deficit by approximately $15 billion
under congressional budget rules. 337 In preparing its estimate, CBO
recognized:
Although the probability that the FDIC will have
to liquidate a systemically important firm in any year is
small, the potential cash flows associated with resolving
them would likely be large. CBO’s baseline projections
reflect the estimated probability of various scenarios
regarding the frequency and magnitude of systemic
financial problems. 338
CBO also recognized that “the FDIC would eventually recover the cost
of any additional losses by raising assessments on insured deposits;
however, CBO estimates that such recoveries would occur over many
years.” 339 “The true cost to taxpayers from OLA is zero, although over
an arbitrary ten-year period it may be counted as having a cost. Thus, if
OLA is counted as increasing the deficit over a ten-year period, repealing
OLA is counted as reducing the deficit.” 340
Based on the CBO score, repeal of OLA under Title II of the
Dodd-Frank Act would result in deficit reduction of $15 billion. 341 This
budget “savings” made the repeal of OLA a very attractive target for its
opponents. By including repeal of OLA in the reconciliation bill, they

Testimony,
FED.
DEPOSIT
INS.
CORP.,
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2015/spmay1215.html
[https://perma.cc/Y7RM-7Q75] (last updated May 13, 2015).
336. Dodd-Frank § 214, 12 U.S.C. § 5394(b).
337. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE OF H.R. 4894: A BILL TO REPEAL TITLE II OF
THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 3 (2016)
ESTIMATE
OF
H.R.
4894],
[hereinafter
CBO
COST
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/costestimate/hr4894.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GU6D-9XCM].
338. Id.
339. Id. at 4.
340. Aaron Klein, A Primer on Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority, BROOKINGS
(June 5, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/06/05/a-primer-on-doddfranks-orderly-liquidation-authority/ [https://perma.cc/PJR8-59A3].
341. CBO COST ESTIMATE OF H.R. 4894, supra note 337, at 5.
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could achieve a very substantial savings under the budget rules and
achieve a major legislative goal at the same time.
Previous efforts by opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act to repeal
OLA had been unsuccessful in a world of divided government with no
support by Democrats in the Senate, 342 so reconciliation was frequently
considered as a way to amend OLA. 343 In the end, however, OLA was
not included in the reconciliation bills during the two years of Republican
control of the House and Senate from 2017 to 2018. Instead, the
Republican leadership chose to use reconciliation as the legislative
vehicle for other high-profile, controversial legislation, such as the
unsuccessful attempt to repeal the Affordable Care Act and the successful
effort to enact the Trump Administration’s tax cuts. 344 When Democrats
retook the House in 2018, reconciliation ceased being a viable legislative
alternative to repeal OLA for the time being.
E.

Bankruptcy Code

As detailed above, opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act sought to
repeal OLA through the CHOICE Act and reconciliation. However,
simply repealing OLA begged the question of how to handle the failure
of large, complex financial institutions when the bankruptcy process
failed so completely during the financial crisis. To address this issue,
opponents proposed amending the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 345 to address
the failure of large financial institutions. 346

342. Andrew Leonard, Sabotage: The New GOP Plan, SALON (May 4, 2012, 3:45 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2012/05/04/sabotage_the_new_gop_plan/ [https://perma.cc/V9U8QQYX].
343. Norbert Michel, Budget Reconciliation: A Viable Path for CHOICE Act Reforms,
FORBES
(Sept.
4,
2017,
10:26
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/norbertmichel/2017/09/04/budget-reconciliation-a-viablepath-for-choice-act-reforms/#3d8627b9496f [https://perma.cc/A9T6-EU92].
344. Ryan Rainey, GOP Lawmakers Weighing Whether to Use Tax Bill to Dismantle
Dodd-Frank, MORNING CONSULT: FIN. REG. (Sept. 28, 2017, 5:14 PM),
https://morningconsult.com/2017/09/28/gop-lawmakers-weighing-whether-use-tax-billdismantle-dodd-frank/ [https://perma.cc/MWH8-QUGE].
345. See S. 1861, 113th Congress (2013) (illustrating legislation introduced by Senators
Cornyn and Toomey to create a new Chapter 14 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code); H.R. 5421,
113th Cong. (2014) (proposing to add a new subchapter V to Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code).
346. See S. 1861; H.R. 5421.

62

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 24

The Dodd-Frank Act contemplates bankruptcy as the first option
in the case of a large systemic financial institution. 347 Before triggering
the OLA, 348 the Act requires a determination by the Secretary of the
Treasury, based on a recommendation from super majorities of the
Boards of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, 349 that a resolution of the
firm under any other federal law, such as bankruptcy, “would have
serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United States.” 350
Section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires certain defined financial
institutions to provide resolution plans for the rapid and orderly resolution
of the institutions in the event of material financial distress or failure to
facilitate a resolution either in bankruptcy or under OLA. 351 These plans
are required to be submitted to the Federal Reserve and the FDIC for
review. 352
Once OLA is triggered, the FDIC is granted powers and
authorities similar to those it has historically exercised to manage the
failure of a bank, including the authority to establish bridge companies
and transfer assets. 353 To clarify how it would exercise those powers and
authorities in the context of OLA, the FDIC published a plan, called the
single point of entry (“SPOE”) strategy, describing how it would manage
the failure of a systemic institution. 354
Opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act and OLA in the House
introduced legislation, the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act
(“FIBA”), 355 to add a new subchapter V to Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code and to address the special circumstances of the failure
347. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
203(a)(2)(F), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(2)(F) (2018).
348. Id. § 203(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(2).
349. Id. § 203(a)(1)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)(1)(A).
350. Id. § 203(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(2).
351. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a), (d)(1) (2018) (stating that bank holding companies with total
consolidated assets of $250 billion or more and nonbank financial companies designated by
the FSOC are subject to the OLA). Note that the EGRRCPA increased this threshold to $250
billion—the original threshold set by the Dodd-Frank Act was $50 billion. Compare DoddFrank Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 113, 124 Stat. 1376, 1398–1402 (2010) (setting threshold at $50 billion); with Economic
Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (“EGRRCPA”), Pub. L. No. 115174, § 401, 132 Stat. 1296, 1356–59 (2018) (raising threshold from $50 billion to $250
billion).
352. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a), (d)(1).
353. 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (2018); cf. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (2018).
354. Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of
Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76614 (Dec. 18, 2013) (notice and request for comments).
355. H.R. 5421, 113th Cong. (2014).
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of a large, complex financial institution. FIBA would authorize
bankruptcy courts to operate over forty-eight hours to move the original
firm’s operations to a new bridge company and all operating subsidiaries
would remain outside of the bankruptcy. The bridge company would be
recapitalized by leaving behind long-term, unsecured debt to absorb the
losses of the firm. Derivatives contracts would be stayed, and the
proceedings would be overseen by a federal bankruptcy judge.
A similar bill, the Taxpayer Protection and Responsible
Resolution Act, 356 was introduced in the Senate but took the additional
step of repealing OLA. Interestingly, both bills essentially codified the
SPOE strategy that the FDIC had developed in bankruptcy for systemic
financial institutions. However, neither addressed the issues of funding,
international cooperation, and preplanning that were so important to the
SPOE strategy.
FIBA passed the House by voice vote in the 113th, 114th, and
115th Sessions of Congress. During debate, Democrats supported the
legislation as a complement to OLA in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.
They noted that the bill would improve the bankruptcy process and
increase the chances that Title II would not need to be invoked in an
emergency. They also made clear that their support was contingent on
the bill not repealing Title II OLA. 357
The concept of bankruptcy reform as a complement to Title II of
the Dodd-Frank Act, rather than a replacement, has gained momentum
over time. In a July 2015 hearing on the Taxpayer Protection and
Responsible Resolution Act, 358 none of the witnesses called to support
the bill were willing to support the repeal of Title II and most viewed it
as an important backstop. 359 In April 2017, President Trump issued a
memorandum to the Secretary of the Treasury directing him to “examine
. . . OLA . . . to propose recommendations for reform of OLA guided by
356. S. 1861, 113th Cong. (2013).
357. CONG. REC. H8178 (dailey ed. Dec. 1, 2014) (statement of Representative Conyers),

https://www.congress.gov/113/crec/2014/12/01/CREC-2014-12-01-pt1-PgH8174-4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4BZ6-LGF2] (“[T]his bill, unlike similar legislation in the Senate, doesn’t
include any controversial provisionsaimed at undoing the important protections of the DoddFrank Act.”).
358. S. 1861, 113th Cong. (2013).
359. The Role of Bankruptcy Reform in Addressing Too Big to Fail: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Prot., S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs,
114th Cong. 18–20 (2015) (statement of Simon Johnson, Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of
Entrepreneurship, MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt.), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG114shrg97650/pdf/CHRG-114shrg97650.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Q5C-ULWC].

64

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 24

the Core Principles[360] and to examine whether a new chapter of the
Bankruptcy Code should be adopted for the resolution of financial
companies.” 361 Following the examination of OLA, the Treasury
recommended revisions to it and “retaining OLA as an emergency tool
for use under only extraordinary circumstances.” 362 Treasury went on to
state:
While bankruptcy must be the presumptive option, the
bankruptcy of large, complex financial institutions may
not be feasible in some circumstances, including when
there is insufficient private financing. In those cases, a
reformed OLA process—with predictable, clear
allocation of losses to shareholders and creditors—is a far
preferable alternative to destabilizing financial contagion
or ad hoc government bailouts. 363
With this determination by the Treasury Department, it seems
unlikely that Congress will repeal OLA in the near future. However, it is
important to note that, even with strong bipartisan support, Congress has
not yet passed legislation to improve the ability of the bankruptcy system
to handle the failure of systemically significant institutions even thougth
the Dodd-Frank Act retains this as the first option.
F.

Congressional Review Act

The Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) 364 is a law that
previously only had been used one time between its passage in 1994 and
2017. As the name suggests, the law establishes a mechanism for
Congress to review certain agency rules before they become effective. 365
360. Exec. Order No. 13722, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 3, 2017); see infra Part V
(excerpting Core Principles).
361. Memorandum from President Donald J. Trump on Orderly Liquidation Authority for
the Secretary of the Treasury (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD201700266/pdf/DCPD-201700266.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG7T-6VFS].
362. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM ISSUED APRIL 21, 2017, ORDERLY
LIQUIDATION
AUTHORITY
AND
BANKRUPTCY
REFORM
2
(2018),
https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-02/OLA_REPORT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/295T-NDYJ].
363. Id.
364. Congressional Review Act (“CRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 868 (1996).
365. See supra Part III.A (discussing CRA).
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Congress had previously sought to exercise a review over agency
rulemaking through the mechanism of the “legislative veto” which was
invalidated by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. 366
Under the CRA, agencies must submit final rules to Congress and
the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) for review. 367 In the
case of “major rules,” defined as those rules that have an annual impact
on the economy of more than $100 million, 368 the rules do not take effect
until sixty legislative days after the report is submitted. 369 Non-major
rules take effect as otherwise provided by law upon submission to
Congress. 370 The class of rules covered by the CRA is broader than the
definition of rules under the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements,
and provides that “some agency actions, such as guidance documents,
that are not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures may
still be considered rules under the CRA.” 371
In the case of major rules, once the rule is submitted, the rule
takes effect on the later of (a) sixty legislative days after submission to
Congress, or (b) publication in the Federal Register unless Congress
passes and the President signs a joint resolution of disapproval. 372 The
joint resolution is considered under expedited procedures and is not
subject to the sixty-vote cloture requirement in the Senate. 373 If the rule
was submitted within sixty legislative days of adjournment, the new
Congress may consider the resolution of disapproval. 374 If Congress
adopts and the President signs a resolution of disapproval, a rule
may not be reissued in substantially the same form, and a
new rule that is substantially the same as such a rule may
not be issued, unless the reissued or new rule is

366. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–58 (1983) (holding statutory one-house
legislative veto procedure violated constitutional requirements of bicameralism and
presentment).
367. CRA § 251, 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1) (2018).
368. Id. § 251, 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (2018).
369. Id. § 251, 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3).
370. Id. § 251, 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(4).
371. VALERIE C. BRANNON & MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45248, THE
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT: DETERMINING WHICH “RULES” MUST BE SUBMITTED TO
CONGRESS
1
(2019),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45248
[https://perma.cc/92YH-BYVP].
372. CRA § 251, 5 U.S.C § 801(b).
373. Id. § 251, 5 U.S.C. § 802(d) (2018).
374. Id. § 251, 5 U.S.C. § 801(d).

66

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 24

specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of
the joint resolution disapproving the original rule. 375
While the effectiveness of the CRA is limited by time and
circumstance, a change in administration combined with unified
government can make it highly effective. Once the Republicans gained
control of the House, the Senate, and the Presidency in early 2017, they
were able to use the CRA to some effect against regulations issued under
the Dodd-Frank Act. 376 With the availability of this tool, opponents of
the Dodd-Frank Act moved quickly to target the handful of rules that fit
the criteria of the CRA.
The SEC’s extractive minerals rule discussed in Part II of this
377
Article was the first rule to be targeted with the CRA. 378 The long
court battles around rulemaking to implement section 1504 of the DoddFrank Act 379 had delayed the rulemaking to the point that it fit within the
CRA timeframe of sixty legislative days. 380 Following passage in the
House and the Senate, the President signed the joint resolution of
disapproval into law on February 14, 2017, blocking the SEC rule
proposed under section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 381 With the
statutory requirement for rulemaking under section 1504 still in place, the
SEC recently proposed a rule 382 that includs several changes from the
congressionally disapproved 2016 rule. 383 The SEC made these changes
to promulgate the statutorily-required rule while at the same time

375. Id. § 251, 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2).
376. Amber Phillips, Why Republicans’ 100-Day War on Obama is About to End, WASH.

POST (Apr. 25, 2017, 12:36 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2017/04/25/why-republicans-100-day-war-on-obama-is-about-to-end/
[https://perma.cc/Z3AJ-TZVF].
377. See supra Part II.
378. Steven Mufson, Trump Signs Law Rolling Back Disclosure Rule for Energy and
Mining
Companies,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
14,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-signs-law-rolling-backdisclosure-rule-for-energy-and-mining-companies/2017/02/14/ccd93e90-f2cd-11e6-b9c9e83fce42fb61_story.html [https://perma.cc/CP9G-G8SN].
379. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q) (2018).
380. See supra Part III.C.3.
381. Pub. L. No. 115-4, 115th Cong., 131 Stat. 9 (2017).
382. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extration Issuers, 85 Fed. Reg. 2522 (proposed
Jan. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b).
383. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed. Reg. 49360 (July 27,
2016) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b).
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complying with the CRA’s requirement that any new rule not be
“substantially the same” 384 as the rule that had been disapproved. 385
In the area of financial regulations, Congress next used the CRA
to invalidate a CFPB rule on arbitration agreements. 386 The rule in
question had been promulgated pursuant to section 1028(b) of the DoddFrank Act, 387 which allows the CFPB to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in the consumer finance arena. In that case, rather than
looking back to a rule from a prior administration, Congress
contemporaneously invalidated a rule promulgated by an independent
financial regulator with a holdover Director.
The third instance of opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act using the
CRA illustrated a new, more-expansive application of the CRA. 388 In
that case, Congress invalidated guidance issued by the CFPB on indirect
auto lending that had been issued in 2013. 389 Congressional action on the
five-year-old guidance was possible because, as described above, the
CRA uses the APA definition of “rule” which includes agency actions
beyond those that require APA rulemaking. 390 While the APA provides
that notice-and-comment rulemaking is not required for interpretative
rules or general statements of policy, they still fall under the definition of
“rules” under the CRA. 391
In addition, the “rule” could be reviewed five years after it was
issued because, over time, a body of practice has evolved where Congress
can request that the GAO opine on whether a particular agency action

384. Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) § 251, 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (2018).
385. Id.
386. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 (July 19, 2017) (codified at 12 C.F.R.

pt. 1040).
387. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1028, 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2018).
388. Joe Adler & Neil Haggerty, Does Senate’s Repeal of CFPB Policy Put All Guidance
In
Crosshairs?,
AM.
BANKER
(Apr.
18,
2018,
3:37
PM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/does-senates-repeal-of-cfpb-policy-put-allguidance-in-crosshairs [https://perma.cc/89G6-M2YM].
389. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. NO. 2013-02, INDIRECT AUTO
LENDING AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT 1–5 (2013)
[hereinafter
CFPB
BULL.
NO.
2013-02],
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_march_-Auto-Finance-Bulletin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RWY7-5EBQ]; see also Adler & Haggerty, supra note 388 (noting Senate’s
repeal of CFPB’s guidance on auto loans and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act).
390. Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) § 551(4), 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2018).
391. BRANNON & CAREY, supra note 371, at 12.
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qualifies as a rule under the CRA. 392 If the GAO determines 393 that the
action was a rule and if the rule had not been submitted to Congress and
the GAO for review, the sixty-day clock starts from the date the GAO
communicates its interpretation to Congress. 394 Thus, in that case,
Congress was able to reach back to a 2013 interpretive bulletin 395 and
invalidate it where it had not been submitted previously to Congress
because the agency did not believe it was a rule requiring submission
under the CRA. 396
The expansive reach of the CRA was also demonstrated in two
recent opinions of the GAO, providing that three issuances of guidance
by the Federal Reserve, going back several years, constituted “rules”
under the CRA and would need to be submitted to Congress. 397 In the
first case, the GAO determined that Supervision and Regulation letters
issued by the Federal Reserve regarding a framework for large bank
supervision and actions banks should take for recovery planning that were
issued in 2012 and 2014 were rules. 398 In the second case, the GAO
determined that the Federal Reserve’s 2011 guidance on model risk
management was also a rule under the CRA. 399

392. Id. at 21–23.
393. The GAO’s determination is likely determinative because 5 U.S.C. § 805 states that

“[n]o determination, finding, action, or omission under this chapter shall be subject to judicial
review.” Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) § 251, 5 U.S.C. § 805 (2018).
394. BRANNON & CAREY, supra note 371, at 24–27.
395. See CFPB BULL. NO. 2013-02, supra note 389, at 1–5.
396. See Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gov’t Accountability
Office, to Senator Patrick J. Toomey 3 (Dec. 5, 2017) (B-329129),
https://www.toomey.senate.gov/files/documents/GAO%20Lending.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DHJ5-XLFH] (“CFPB did not send a report on the Bulletin to Congress or
the Comptroller General because, as stated in their letter to our Office, in their opinion the
Bulletin is not a rule under CRA.”).
397. See Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gov’t Accountability
Office, to Congressional Requestors 1–13 (Oct. 22, 2019) [hereinafter GAO Letter to
Congressional Requesters], https://www.tillis.senate.gov/services/files/7B65B068-8AD14013-8FFA-1CA11B108428 [https://perma.cc/TC2N-VJWY] (discussing congressional
request for GAO’s legal opinion regarding applicability of the CRA to supervision and
regulation letters, specifically, three issued by the Federal Reserve); see also Letter from
Thomas H. Armstrong, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, to Senator Thom R.
Tillis 1–7 (Oct. 22, 2019) [hereinafter GAO Letter to Senator Thom R. Tillis],
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/services/files/7B65B068-8AD1-4013-8FFA-1CA11B108428
[https://perma.cc/LE9V-JCJ6] (discussing congressional request for GAO’s legal opinion
regarding applicability of the CRA to supervision and regulation letter 11-7 issued by the
Federal Reserve).
398. GAO Letter to Congressional Requesters, supra note 397, at 1–13.
399. GAO Letter to Senator Thom R. Tillis, supra note 397, at 1–7.
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With Democrats in control of the House in 2019 and the CRA
window effectively closed for now, the sixty legislative day clock expired
without a successful congressional challenge to these particular guidance
documents. However, the full impact of this expansive interpretation of
the CRA remains to be seen. While agencies generally appear to
regularly submit rules to Congress and the GAO that have been through
notice-and-comment rulemaking, any rules that have not been submitted
may be at risk of congressional disapproval at some future date unless
agencies retroactively submit them. Yet, the application of the CRA to
guidance, FAQs, press releases, and other agency actions may not be that
impactful, as agencies generally do not view those actions as having the
force of law. Nevertheless, under such an expansive interpretation of the
CRA, Congress eventually could find itself inundated with thousands of
agency actions if agencies decided that it was to their benefit to submit
all agency pronouncements out of an abundance of caution.
V. CONCLUSION
The decade-long effort to dismantle Dodd-Frank has been
impressive in its scope, patience, and creativity. Opponents of the Act
have marshalled every tool available to them and acted aggressively when
presented with opportunities. The fallout from the litigation battles has
had a profound effect on many unrelated areas of government, including
recess appointments, ALJ appointments, and agency rulemaking. Yet,
the significant resources expended and the results achieved (or not
achieved) warrant a few additional observations.
First, the effort expended in so many different arenas in attacking
the Dodd-Frank Act created something of a multiplier effect. For
example, congressional letters and hearings elicit responses that provide
fodder for judicial decisions, 400 which in turn generate additional
congressional hearings, document requests and letters This creates a
closed loop of constant attacks on the Dodd-Frank Act. With each attack
building on prior attacks, opponents have been able to delay and alter
implementation. These delays often extended until a new line of attack
presented itself.

400. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 146–147 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Henderson, J.,
dissenting) (citing numerous instances of testimony and responses to congressional inquiries
and restating congressional criticisms of the CFPB).
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Second, observing the mixed results of the extensive lobbying,
litigation, and legislative strategies that have been employed over the past
decade, none of them seem to have been as consequential as the
opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act simply winning elections and replacing
financial agency leadership with like-minded leadership. Shortly after
being sworn in, President Trump issued Executive Order 13772 401 which
required regulators to “regulate the [U.S.] financial system in a manner
consistent with” 402 the following Core Principles:
(a) empower Americans to make independent
financial decisions and informed choices in the
marketplace, save for retirement, and build
individual wealth;
(b) prevent taxpayer-funded bailouts;
(c) foster economic growth and vibrant financial
markets through more rigorous regulatory impact
analysis that addresses systemic risk and market
failures, such as moral hazard and information
asymmetry;
(d) enable American companies to be competitive
with foreign firms in domestic and foreign
markets;
(e) advance American interests in international
financial regulatory negotiations and meetings;
(f) make regulation efficient,
appropriately tailored; and

effective,

and

(g) restore public accountability within Federal
financial regulatory agencies and rationalize the
Federal financial regulatory framework. 403

401. Exec. Order No. 13722, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 3, 2017).
402. Id. at 9965.
403. Id.

2020]

DISMANTLING DODD-FRANK

71

Following these Core Principles, a new full complement of
confirmed agency heads of the federal financial regulators have acted to
materially change supervisory requirements for systemic institutions, 404
and the supervision of large banks. 405 At the CFPB, the impact of the
appointment of a new Director was especially pronounced. In
documenting the changes to the CFPB under Acting Director Mick
Mulvaney, one reporter found:
Over the last year, Mulvaney’s temporary hiring freeze
has turned into an indefinite one, slowly shrinking the
[CFPB’s] staff by attrition. Bureau news releases, once
packed with colorful details about abusive lending
practices, have been toned down to dry legalese. . . . In
2018, the bureau announced just 11 lawsuits or
settlements, less than a third of the number during
Cordray’s last year. In the months since Mulvaney
reorganized the Office of Fair Lending, the bureau has not
brought a single case alleging illegal discrimination.
While Mulvaney pledged data-driven enforcement, his
bureau brought only one case against debt collectors, who
account for more complaints to the [CFPB] than almost
any other industry. Where Mulvaney or his successor
have allowed cases to go forward, lenders have often
settled with lowered fines or none at all. When the bureau
settled a three-year prosecution of a group of payday
lenders called NDG Enterprise — which found that the
404. Comment Letter from former Sec’ys of the U.S. Treasury, Timothy F. Geithner &
Jacob J. Lew, and former Chairs of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Ben S.
Bernanke & Janet L. Yellen, concerning Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of
Certain Nonbank Financial Companies (RIN 4030-ZA00), to Steven T. Mnuchin, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of the Treasury, and Jerome H. Powell, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res.
Sys.,
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/887-bernanke-geithner-lew-yellenletter/a22621b202dfcb0fe06e/optimized/full.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8NX-MKRW] (“[The
proposed guidance] would be contrary to the statutory framework, and would lead the FSOC
to adopt a standard that is unworkable – effectively neutering this authority.”).
405. Danile K. Tarullo, former Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Remarks
at the Americans for Financial Reform Conference on Big Bank Regulation Under the Trump
Administration, Washington, D.C.: Taking the Stress Out of Stress Testing, at 3 (May 21,
2019), https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Tarullo-AFR-Talk.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9BUC-MJGF] (“Unfortunately, I fear that a good bit of that progress to
which I referred a moment ago could be endangered by a kind of low-intensity deregulation,
consisting of an accumulation of non-headline-grabbing changes and an opaque relaxation of
supervisory rigor.”).
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group had falsely threatened American customers with
arrest and imprisonment if they failed to repay loans —
NDG walked away without paying a cent. 406
In the words of an aphorism popular during the Reagan Administration,
“personnel is policy.”
Finally, it is clear that after a decade of conflict, the final battles
over the Dodd-Frank Act have yet to be fought. Deregulation under the
APA must be achieved through and meet the same standards as new
regulation. 407 It remains to be seen if the supporters of the Act will muster
the same level of energy and creativity to repel the deregulatory efforts
to roll back the Dodd-Frank Act 408 as their opponents have already shown
and whether the opponents of the Act will hold themselves or be held to
the same standards for dismantling the Dodd-Frank Act as supporters
were for implementation.

406. Nicholas Confessore, Mick Mulvaney’s Master Class in Destroying a Bureaucracy
from
Within,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.
(Apr.
16,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/magazine/consumer-financial-protection-bureautrump.html [https://perma.cc/F8U7-43NM].
407. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)
(“While the removal of a regulation may not entail the monetary expenditures and other costs
of enacting a new standard, and, accordingly, it may be easier for an agency to justify a
deregulatory action, the direction in which an agency chooses to move does not alter the
standard of judicial review established by law.”).
408. Zachary Warmbrodt, Warren, Waters Blast SEC Financial Advice Rule as Wall Street
Cheers,
POLITICO
(June
25,
2019,
6:15
PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/05/warren-waters-blast-sec-financial-advice-ruleas-wall-street-cheers-1507335 [https://perma.cc/MR5Z-K4ZV].

